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 Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Notification and Authorization 
Dr. Kornel Nagy, International Space Station (ISS) Structural and Mechanical Systems Manager, 
requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provide a quantitative 
assessment of commercially available nondestructive evaluation (NDE) instruments for potential 
application to the ISS.  This work supports risk mitigation as outlined in the ISS Integrated Risk 
Management Application (IRMA) Watch Item #4669, which addresses the requirement for 
structural integrity after an ISS pressure wall leak in the event of a penetration due to 
micrometeoroid or orbital debris impact [ref. 1].  
Dr. Eric Madaras of the Langley Research Center (LaRC) was assigned to lead this assessment.  
The NESC Review Board (NRB) approved the assessment plan on August 9, 2012. 
The key stakeholders for this assessment include, for the ISS Program (ISSP): Kevin Window, 
ISS Vehicle Manager; Kornel Nagy, ISS Structure and Mechanisms Systems Manager; and Bill 
McCann, The Boeing Company’s Mechanical Structural Evaluation and Robotics Systems 
Manager. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
Leaks through the International Space Station (ISS) pressure wall as a result of micrometeoroid 
and orbital debris (MMOD) impact damage are mitigated with patches, provided that the leak 
rate is not so high that the module must be isolated and allowed to depressurize.  However, the 
patch repair process is only a pressure repair and is not intended as a structural repair.  Should 
such damage occur and a pressure patch installed, the ISS Program (ISSP) then needs to assess 
the state of the structural integrity of the damaged pressure wall to ensure continued safe ISS 
operations of the vehicle.  The ability to obtain measurements of the structural state of a 
damaged pressure wall so that structural engineers can assess structural integrity and remaining 
life is part of the process to reduce risks as documented by the ISSP in ISS Risk Management 
Application (IRMA), Watch Item #4669 [ref. 1].  
One approach under ISSP consideration to implement this risk reduction process is to adapt a 
commercially available nondestructive evaluation (NDE) field portable instrument for 
intravehicular activity (IVA) operation aboard the ISS.  The NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center (NESC) was requested by the ISSP to perform an independent assessment of 
commercially available NDE portable instruments and recommend the best instrument that could 
be adapted for this application.  Key aspects to be addressed in this assessment were (1) the 
instrument’s ability to nondestructively characterize pressure wall damage within ISS operational 
constraints, (2) the operational ease of use by ISS crew in a zero-G environment, (3) the 
operational impact of such instrumentation (maintenance and support) on the ISS, and (4) the 
identification of any necessary modifications that would be required for certification of the 
instrument for operations aboard the ISS.   
A team of NDE, ISS operations, and space hardware certification experts, as well as astronauts, 
were assembled to perform this NDE instrumentation assessment.  MMOD and ISS structural 
integrity experts were solicited to provide additional guidance.  The NESC team selected six 
instruments for evaluation.  These instruments were designed for portable field operations and 
are generally viewed by the NDE community as being robust and simple to use.  Three devices 
were phased array ultrasonic test (PAUT) measurement systems, and three devices were related 
to eddy current (EC) systems.  The EC systems utilized either single-probe mechanical scanning 
systems or array sensors.  The PAUT instruments evaluated were the Olympus Omniscan MX 
UT (Ultrasonic Test), the Sonatest Veo, and the General Electric (GE)® PhasorTM; the EC 
instruments were the Olympus Omniscan MX EC array, the UniWest® 454A ECS3 mechanical 
scanner, and the Jentek® GridStation® Meandering Winding Magnetometer (MWM)® Array.   
This assessment resulted in 15 findings, which are listed in Section 8.1.  The primary finding was 
that all of the NDE systems were sensitive to detecting hidden structures such as isogrid webs, 
which could be useful for identifying structural orientation in images, but at the same time those 
structures affected the instrument’s ability to detect damage directly adjacent to the isogrid web 
under a pressure wall repair kit (PWRK) patch.  It was found that PAUT systems were more 
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capable than EC array/scanner systems in detecting and assessing damage from manufactured 
test plates and simulated MMOD impacts with the PWRK patches.  The Sonatest Veo used an 
imaging process called "Top-scan," which saves all of the data from the different inspection 
angles, which could be advantageous for subsequent analysis of the results on the ground in the 
event that the angle initially selected was not optimum.  The ISS crew were able to quickly 
assemble and operate each of the instruments evaluated using only simple one-page procedures 
and without additional training.  All of the scanning systems utilized spring-loaded position 
encoders, except for the UniWest system.  In the zero-G environment, these spring-loaded 
devices will require a reaction force to keep the sensor in contact with the part undergoing 
inspection.  In addition, a level of force was required to hold the sensor in contact with the 
pressure wall.  To react against those forces necessary to perform scans and operate the NDE 
equipment in a zero-G environment, the astronauts identified the need to provide a restraint 
during inspection activities, as well as the need for the system to be operated with one hand only 
so that the other hand remains free to activate instrument buttons.  The probes/scanning 
components of the assessed NDE instruments were currently too large to permit inspections 
underneath racks and fixed structures and behind panels.  Although all of the instruments were 
deemed usable, several astronauts expressed a preference for the Sonatest Veo system because of 
its simpler operating controls and computer-human interface, plus the visual display made 
identification of flaws more intuitive (a Top-scan capability) for untrained personnel helping 
them to quickly assess the validity of a measurement.  The Sonatest Veo and Olympus Omniscan 
MX UT (and MX2) PAUT systems had electromagnetic interference (EMI) emission 
exceedances.  The information provided by the vendors regarding the materials contained in 
these instruments was incomplete.  The Olympus Omniscan MX UT and Sonatest Veo systems 
exceeded thermal touch temperatures in a vacuum environment, although this is not a 
requirement for currently planned operational scenarios. 
The assessment’s observations are found in Section 8.2.  The primary observation was that the 
development of nonstandard methods and procedures will be required to enable quantitative 
measurements of damage under an ISS pressure repair patch.  The use of the Human Research 
Facility (HRF) operations model for conducting body ultrasound could be used as a guide for the 
development of NDE on-orbit inspection operations procedures.    
The NESC recommendations directed to the ISSP, in the event that a decision is made to utilize 
NDE instrumentation aboard the ISS to mitigate IRMA Risk 4669, were to select the Sonatest 
Veo PAUT system for development and certification for flight based on the findings; develop 
methods to enable ISS crew to apply reaction forces against scanning system spring-loaded 
encoders in a zero-G environment or identify alternative scanning system designs that do not 
require reaction forces; and develop compatible sensors and scanning system components to 
enable inspections over the maximum percentage of ISS module surface area.  
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5.0 Assessment Plan 
The purpose of this assessment was to evaluate the commercial field portable NDE equipment 
that would best address the risk mitigation steps outlined in IRMA 4669, leading to the down 
selection of the most appropriate instrumentation for flight.  This assessment reviewed ISS 
requirements that levy significant constraints on ISS on-orbit instrumentation and operations.  
During this assessment, several issues were considered, which included: 
1. Will the instrument provide relevant information that structural engineers require for 
evaluating the complex nature of damage in the ISS pressure wall (e.g., crack lengths and 
directions, wall thinning, and wall deformation)?  
2. Can the equipment properly function within constraints or interference from the local 
complexity of the structure and the interference caused by the presence of any pressure 
repair that is blocking direct access to the damaged area?  
3. Would the user interface (UI) and functionality of the equipment be compatible with 
operational constraints, considering that the ISS crew will be untrained regarding the 
operation of the equipment?  That is, can ISS crew perform the measurements and 
understand whether a quantitatively valid measurement has been made?  Will the use and 
maintenance of the instrumentation require unrealistic time resources?  
4. Is there a reasonable chance that the equipment will meet Common Interface 
Requirements Document (CIRD)-SSP 50835 for the ISS (e.g., electromagnetic emissions, 
battery constraints) without impractical reengineering?   
The NESC team consisted of experts in NDE, ISS structural requirements, CIRD knowledge, and 
applicable flight operations.  This assessment of NDE equipment to address these issues could 
directly lead to satisfying the requirements of the ISSP regarding how to address IRMA 4669.  
This assessment will be used as the basis for the generation of a change request (CR) to the ISS 
to support IRMA 4669, starting in fiscal year 2013.   
In the original assessment plan, a fifth issue was identified to evaluate the equipment’s ability to 
reach and operate in areas with limited access, which exist in many of the areas of the ISS.  That 
is, if a patch repair can be installed within a limited access area, then can the NDE equipment 
also reach and operate at that location?  This question was not fully explored in this assessment.  
It quickly became apparent that all of the NDE systems would require modifications in order to 
fit behind racks and panels, if required, and that their scanning capabilities would need to be 
enhanced in order to make a practical system that could reach areas of concern behind racks and 
panels.  For the ISS Vehicle Office, it seemed more efficient to first work, under a phase I effort, 
on manifesting an NDE system that could address 70 percent of the wall surface for the United 
States (U.S.) modules.  For the Russian hardware, the percentage was closer to 30 percent, as 
much of the service module (SM) has fixed panels, making access more difficult.   
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A phase II effort will be proposed to address the issues related to accessing the remaining  
30 percent of the U.S. module walls and 70 percent of the Russian hardware.  Evaluation and 
discussions with manufacturers’ representatives provided reasonable confidence that specialized 
probes could be fabricated and adapted to maximize the U.S. module inspection areas. 
This assessment was separated into three components.  One was an assessment of a set of 
commercial, portable instruments to see how well they could perform the required NDE testing 
on representative samples with the potential repair plates or tape patches that are currently 
certified for ISS use.  For this part of the assessment, sets of instruments were selected, and 
various impacted test plates and test standard plates were manufactured or acquired.  Testing 
processes were developed to allow testing in a manner that would be compatible with actual 
space operations.  The second part of the assessment was to have astronauts and operations 
personnel evaluate the instruments from their knowledge of operations requirements and  
zero-G effects on-orbit using procedures developed by the first team.  The third part was to 
perform engineering evaluations on the best systems to ensure that certification was feasible for 
those instruments.  As a final step in the assessment, each of the systems under each of the three 
teams was individually ranked, and then an aggregate ranking was developed from which a down 
selection could be made. 
6.0 Problem Description and Proposed Solutions 
6.1 Problem Description 
There is a high risk of module damage/penetration from MMOD impact to the ISS over the life 
of the Program.  At present, the current ISS prediction is that there is greater than a 33-percent 
probability of ISS penetration from MMOD over a 10-year period (see Appendix B [ref. 2]).  
MMOD debris threats have been changing as space junk collisions and recent antisatellite 
weapons testing create more debris and as additional modules are manifested.  Although on-orbit 
leak repair kits are available for pressure loss mitigation, these kits do not address structural 
repair.  The needed quantitative NDE damage assessment tools to support the evaluation and 
repair of structural damage are not on-orbit.   
In 2011, at the ISS On-Orbit ISS Leak Detection and Repair Committee’s International 
Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) in Moscow, Russia, the topic of structural repair after 
MMOD penetration was discussed.  One of the points made at that meeting was the need to 
characterize the degree of damage and to certify any repair made.  Typically, both of those needs 
would be met by NDE means.  It was stated that commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) NDE 
equipment was at a state of development that it should be investigated for such purposes [ref. 3].  
The information from that TIM was subsequently included in updated ISS IRMA Watch Item 
#4669 [ref. 1], a process whereby ISS risks are systematically addressed.   
In 2012, a NASA team sought to develop a preliminary concept of operations for how NDE 
would be applied on-orbit to understand the requirements for NDE equipment.  Generally, there 
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are two conditions to consider.  First, if the ISS should suffer a pressure wall penetration due to 
MMOD damage, which could be repaired with an IVA patch kit, then structural evaluation could 
be subsequently performed by IVA means.  If a structural repair is required, then certification of 
the repair would also be performed by IVA means.  Second, if a leak were too large to repair in a 
timely manner, the ISS crew would be forced to let the module decompress.  Whether the repair 
was structural or pressure only, an extravehicular activity (EVA) repair would be required to 
allow the module to be repressurized.  Depending on the nature of the repair, it is possible that 
certification of the repair could be accomplished via IVA means.  In these cases, the NDE 
operations would be performed in a pressurized module and would not be operated under 
emergency conditions. 
Once an understanding of the requirements was obtained, the NASA team investigated the types 
of instrumentation that would suit their needs.  It became clear that an organized assessment of 
appropriate NDE instrumentation was required to address the varied needs outlined by the 
concept of operations, which lead to the request for an assessment by the NESC to determine 
which field portable NDE equipment would best address IRMA 4669. 
6.2 Proposed Solution 
The assessment of the best instrument required that three areas of concern be evaluated.  First, 
would an NDE instrument be able to make the needed measurements of the types of damage 
produced, given the constraints the repair might impose on the measurement process?  This 
could include issues such as accessing the repaired wall, imaging a flaw with a repair seal in 
place, and imaging and quantifying complex damage.  Second, would the ISS crew be able to 
perform the needed testing on-orbit under zero-G conditions?  Note that standard NDE certified 
processes require a certified individual with demonstrated skills in applying a procedure be used 
for such a measurement.  Generally, ISS crew members are not expected to be certified.  There 
were also issues regarding how complex the system would be to assemble and operate on-orbit, 
how many crew members would be necessary to operate the system, and how much time the 
testing would require.  How would an astronaut determine whether the measured data were 
adequate?  How would the data be processed after the measurement and other operational issues?  
How would instrumentation be maintained on-orbit, including the issues of mass, volume, and 
storage needs?  The third area of concern was the critical issue of certification for flight.  The 
cost of instrumentation modifications could be prohibitive.  Safety issues stemming from power, 
materials, and EMI would need to be investigated as a part of selecting a system for flight.  Thus, 
three issues were the focus of this assessment: (1) the capability of the commercial field portable 
equipment to make relevant measurements, (2) the impacts of the instrument on operations/crew, 
and (3) flight certification considerations.  Each of these issues was evaluated separately, and 
then an integrated assessment was made to determine whether a single device could achieve the 
required ISS applications. 
The NESC team determined that the main focus of the devices should be centered on PAUT and 
EC techniques, as these are mature technologies and are already the basis for certified methods 
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listed in NASA-STD-5009, “Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture Critical 
Metallic Components” [ref. 4].  Other methods such as radiography, which require two-sided 
operations and would involve EVA efforts, were not considered because of concept-of-
operations violations.  Similarly, methods such as penetrant and thermography fail to detect 
cracks or damage on the far side of the wall and under the PWRK.  Novel and development 
devices such as X-ray backscatter were not considered because the current state of development 
was not mature in areas such as operations, compactness, power, size, and safety.  Thus, the tasks 
required for this assessment were as follows. 
6.2.1 Finalize Evaluation Criteria for Down-selecting Best Available NDE 
Instrumentation 
Each of the three assessment groups generated an evaluation table to score the various 
instruments with regard to their specific concerns for on-orbit operations.  In principle, the 
assessment of NDE capabilities evaluated the ability of a system to accomplish the test required 
regardless of cost—if the system could not accomplish the required task, it did not matter what 
the other assessments indicated, the method was not considered.  
The other assessments evaluate various costs of implementation.  The engineering assessment 
considered the cost before deployment.  Low scores in this category typically indicated the need 
for expensive modifications.  The on-orbit operations assessment considered continuing 
operational costs.  A low score here suggested high costs in manpower and support.  There may 
sometimes be an inverse correlation between the operations cost and the engineering cost since a 
cheaper device might be chosen and deployed only to be difficult to work with on-orbit, thereby 
increasing the operations budget.  The reverse can also be true—by spending more on 
engineering, future operations might be simplified and less expensive.  It was necessary that this 
assessment capture these features correctly. 
6.2.1.1 Assess NDE Capabilities 
Each device was to be scored against its ability to measure flaws in test plates with manufactured 
and realistic flaws under conditions of unrepaired or repaired with one of two PWRK repairs: a 
tape repair patch and a hard-plate “o-ring” sealing repair.  In the case of bonded repairs, no 
PWRK patch would be in place.  The scoring was grouped into three values.  A value of 2 
indicated that the system was able to measure all or nearly all of the flaw indications present.  A 
value of 1 indicated that the system was able to detect the largest flaws but might not have the 
signal to noise to detect many of the smaller or minor flaws.  A value of 0 indicated that the 
system was unable to give any measurable indications in the area of interest.  The test samples 
were grouped into three groups: plates with manufactured flaws such as electric discharge 
machining (EDM) notches or partial through-the-thickness holes in aluminum plates; plates 
impacted by hypervelocity projectiles displaying pitting, cracks, holes, and deformation; and 
plates with bond-line flaws.  Each of these groups of samples was averaged separately over all of 
the test articles in that group: manufacture flaw sample group, hypervelocity damage group, and 
the bonded plate group.  The final score was based on the average of these three group scores.   
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6.2.1.2 Conduct On-orbit Operations Assessment  
Each device was evaluated against the following list of criteria: crew time for measurements, 
setup/teardown time, NDE expertise/training required by crew, preventive/calibration/upkeep 
actions required, access requirements, number of crew required, and size (storage and access 
impacts).  Each of these criteria was rated on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 represented a low 
performance factor and 5 represented a high factor.  For example, for the first criterion listed 
(i.e., crew time required to make a measurement), a score of 1 would indicate constant user 
attention and interaction to produce a measurement, while a score of 5 would indicate that the 
crew could set and forget.  In a similar manner, the issue of NDE expertise/training required by 
the crew would reflect how difficult it was for the crew to operate the equipment, representing 
issues like system complexity, necessary training, and the system software user interface.  In this 
case, a score of 0 would be assigned if a system was highly complex and required hours of 
training or if the user interface required many buttons to be operated when producing a scan.   
A score of 5 would be given to a device that required few buttons to operate, was intuitive in its 
operations, and would require no additional training other than a crew background training video 
just before testing.  Each of these categories was weighted to reflect its importance to operations.  
The final score was then a ranking between 0 and 5 for each system. 
6.2.1.3 Conduct Engineering Assessment 
Due to cost and schedule limitations, only three of the devices were subjected to engineering 
testing and assessment.  Based on the results from the other two assessment groups, the top three 
contenders were subjected to engineering assessments, including EMI radiated emissions and 
susceptibility, power inverter compatibility testing, thermal analysis, materials analysis for off-
gassing, and high-level safety analysis.  This assessment assigned a value of 0 to 5 for each of 
these categories.  The individual test categories were weighted, so this assessment component 
ranged from 0 to 5 in value. 
6.2.2 Select NDE Systems to Evaluate 
Portable NDE devices that automate as many functions as possible were considered to simplify 
astronaut operations, especially because the astronauts will not be provided a great deal of 
training before needing to utilize these devices.  Functions like making scanning easy and 
providing a good visual indication of the scan were considered helpful.  Having the astronauts 
perform manual pointwise scanning would be tedious, as well as worrisome, because they may 
not be trained to interpret raw data signals correctly.  The types of capabilities sought were often 
found on high-end NDE equipment, commonly on array systems.  Therefore, this became the 
general direction for selecting instrumentation.  NASA already owns instruments that were 
relevant for this purpose, and NASA NDE personnel were already familiar with many types of 
commercial instruments of this nature.  In addition, the NESC NDE Technical Discipline Team 
was queried for its knowledge of other instruments to broaden the scope of devices to be 
considered.  Finally, an Internet search for additional appropriate NDE systems was performed.  
These efforts narrowed the selection down to six devices to be investigated: three PAUT systems 
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and three EC systems (of the EC systems, two used array probes and one used a motorized point 
scanning unit).  All six of these devices have a history in portable field operations.  The 
ultrasonic phased arrays were the Olympus Omniscan MX UT, the Sonatest Veo, and the GE 
Phasor.  The EC units were the Olympus Omniscan MX EC Array, the Jentek Grid Station 
MWM Array, and the UniWest A454 ECS3 mechanical scanner.  All systems tended to be 
relatively easy to use, robust, compact, and provided a good visual interface.  NASA currently 
owns the Olympus Omniscan MX UT and EC models.  The other models were either borrowed 
or rented as necessary. 
6.2.3 Finalize Design and Manufacture of Set of Appropriate Physical Standards on 
which to Test 
The variety of structural geometries on the ISS is extensive and presents a challenge to 
developing all of the testing configurations required.  This assessment required a minimal set of 
physical standards against which to test that would address the vast majority of geometries that 
ISS crew members are likely to face.  Appendix C contains the drawings for a series of samples 
with EDM notches and partial through-the-thickness holes in samples, representing some of the 
common geometries found on the ISS.  The test standards were scanned from the IVA side of the 
plate, while the emulated damage was placed on the EVA side of the plate.  Thus, the systems 
tested had to detect the flaw not only under a repair patch but also needed to detect the flaw on 
the far side of the plate.  Ultimately, there were ten manufactured standards with EDM notches 
and partial through-the-thickness holes, including multisite configurations with a 1/16-inch or 
3/16-inch thickness, a Russian wall waffle pattern, and various curvatures representative of the 
ISS.  This assessment also used five plates, including a waffle-patterned plate (Russian 
functional and cargo module (FGB) style), which was impacted with hypervelocity particles that 
caused various types of damage from modest to extensive.  The impact damage included pitting, 
penetrations, cracks, and deformation.  Finally, there were four bonded plates with bond-line 
flaws, which have some relevance to the certification of a structural bonded doubler repair.  
There are other structural repair scenarios, but because these were not well defined at this time, 
they were not addressed with this set of physical standards.  Appendix C gives a listing of the 
manufactured samples with their referenced flaws. 
6.2.4 Develop Procedures for Evaluating NDE Instrumentation to Lead to Down-selecting 
the Best Available Instrument 
To deal with the issue of repair patches that are in use on the ISS, it was decided that the UT 
array systems would employ an angle beam wedge that would divert the ultrasonic energy down 
the surface of a plate, which would reflect from a flaw and travel back into the sensor for 
imaging.  This is similar to what is used for weld testing.  The ISS conditions are unique because 
for weld testing the damaged area is usually within 0.5 inch of the probe, while for the ISS 
scanning the damaged area must be 5 to 6 inches from the probe.  This means that the energy 
must reflect between the top and bottom surfaces a dozen or more times instead of once or twice, 
and beam spreading is more extensive.  Procedures were set up for all three phased array systems 
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using this test protocol.  The phased array probes could also be used to direct the energy 
perpendicular to the plate’s surface and image the plate thickness directly below the sensor.  
Because this can’t be done adequately in the presence of the repair patches, this procedure was 
not extensively tested in this assessment.  It was used for grading the case of the bond-line plates. 
The EC devices needed to scan over the top of the patches in order to work.  They also need to 
be able to penetrate through the metal to see the damage on the opposite side of the plate.  
Therefore, the EC systems were applied through the patches where possible. 
For all of the systems, simple operating lab procedures were established for the astronauts to use 
for their part of the testing. 
6.2.5 Perform Testing with Instrument Systems (test in-house instruments or borrow or 
rent relevant systems) 
Once the procedures were established, a team of NDE individuals (Dr. Ajay Koshti, Mr. Dave 
Stanley, Mr. Miles Skow, and Dr. Eric Madaras) performed the scans.  The scans were 
performed at Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) NDE lab in an effort to maintain consistent 
applications.  For the EC equipment, industrial representatives provided assistance in setting up 
their devices to help ensure that those devices were configured as optimally as possible. 
6.2.6 Obtain Astronaut Office, Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), and Operations 
Support Office (OSO) Qualitative Assessments and Inputs Regarding On-orbit NDE 
Equipment Interface and Operational Appropriateness 
During the in-house NDE testing, OSO representatives and the astronauts spent time running 
through each procedure and operating each instrument.  They then provided feedback regarding 
the pros and cons for each device and the problems anticipated for use on the ISS.  The following 
astronauts provided their inputs for this project:  Mr. Don Pettit, Ms. Shannon Walker, Ms. 
Dottie Metcalf-Lindenburger, Mr. Mike Fincke, Mr. Kimiya Yui, and Ms. Serena Aunon. 
6.2.7 Produce an Engineering Assessment of CIRD COTS Hardware Compatibility for 
Top Choices 
The minimum cost per unit of an NDE system that would be manifested to the ISS includes the 
base unit cost plus additional certification costs.  ISS commercial equipment certification would 
include the costs of various modifications to the systems that might be required.  Therefore, these 
engineering tests will be important in understanding the true costs of the system and will help 
reduce cost and schedule risks. 
There are several tests that could impact the COTS certification of this hardware.  These tests 
include but are not limited to thermal touch temperature, materials/off-gassing, EMI/EMS 
(electromagnetic susceptibility), and power quality.  These tests were applied during the 
engineering part of the assessment.  These tests were applied to only on the most promising 
devices scored under the NDE and operations evaluations sections.  Therefore, the engineering 
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assessments commenced near the end of the NDE and operations testing when it became clear 
which systems were most promising based on the other two assessment components.  
The most expensive testing was the EMI radiation emission and the EMI susceptibility.  That 
testing covered frequency measurements between 14 kHz and 15.5 GHz for the emission testing 
and between 121 MHz and 15.6 GHz for the susceptibility testing.   
Power inverter compatibility tests were performed to evaluate in-rush current and steady-state 
power draw.  The test also verified that the COTS unit was compatible with the ISS power 
inverter and would not require batteries.  On the ISS, batteries are a logistics and safety issue that 
could pose additional cost and schedule risks to the project.  Thermal analysis was performed to 
evaluate touch temperature limitations during ISS operations.  In addition, analysis showed how 
well the units might operate in a scenario where a module had decompressed.  A materials 
analysis was requested to assess material properties, including off-gassing and toxicity that could 
be deemed harmful to people or equipment.  Although all materials have not been identified 
during analysis, consultation from the Materials and Processing (M&P) Manager suggested a  
72-hour bake-out process to mitigate any off-gassing risks when the hardware is to be certified.  
Basic safety hazards were examined prior to and during each test.  No sharp edges or pinch 
points were found.  The units were found to be durable and were designed to withstand 
mechanical shock and other impacts. 
6.2.8 Down Select Instrument 
At the end of the three different assessments, the scores for each instrument from each 
assessment were reviewed, and a discussion of the pros and cons of the top instruments was 
conducted.  A consensus for the down selection was sought. 
6.2.9 Write Final Report 
The products for this assessment were the final report and the down selection of the best system 
for on-orbit instrumentation.   
7.0 Analysis 
7.1 NDE Assessments 
The six devices that were selected for this assessment were all capable, advanced systems that 
have the potential to be valuable for on-orbit NDE needs that include the IRMA 4669 
requirements [ref. 1].  This NDE assessment was focused on the ability of these devices to 
address the issue of quantifying damage under repair patches that might be in place.  The first 
step was to demonstrate the ability to conduct measurements under repair patches in easy-to-
access areas of the pressure wall.  It is believed that all of these devices will need some 
modifications to address all the on-orbit conditions of the ISS.  In particular, it is expected that 
work will need to be performed to address the ability of any of these devices to be able to scan in 
remote, hard-to-access areas.  Given the complexity of that issue, the focus of this assessment 
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was limited to identifying the most appropriate device for addressing the case for easy access 
first.  Afterward, the ISSP can address the more difficult to access locations, focusing on sensor 
modifications and remote scanning processes.  Thus, the NESC team suggests that, if the ISSP 
decides to proceed with the device recommendation, that a multiphase approach be pursued, 
where phase I involves certifying the best available COTS device for proof of concept on ISS; 
later phases can be undertaken to include modifications and adaptations for ease of use, 
portability, and ISS coverage. 
Reference 4 addresses the requirements for detecting flaws with standard testing methods.  
Testing with repair patches in place represents nonstandard testing, so this assessment provided 
information regarding the sensitivity of methods being used in the presence of PWRK repairs.  
The test samples also provided confirmation on how well these systems handle different 
representative surface curvatures; the samples contain manufactured damage to represent pits 
and cracks.  These sample standards will demonstrate some ability to detect by conventional 
methods cracks at the levels called out in NASA-STD-5009.  A report was presented to the 
Space Station Program Control Board (SSPCB) entitled, “MPLM Post-Proof Test Inspection 
Status,” dated February 14, 2005, which identified several locations and their critical flaw sizes 
in the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) [ref. 5]. The MPLM module, which is 
manufactured by the European Space Agency, is similar to the U.S. and Japanese style ISS 
structures.  For the MPLM, the smallest critical flaw size was identified as a 74-mm (2.91-inch) 
crack in an end-cone radial weld (see Appendix A).  
In this assessment, not every test sample and repair configuration was evaluated by every device.  
If an assessment test showed that the physical capabilities of an instrument were surpassed and 
that the instrument could not measure a given sample, then similar tests on more difficult 
samples were dropped as no longer necessary and scored accordingly.  Similarly, if a worst-case 
test was performed and was fully successful, less demanding tests were sometimes skipped as 
unnecessary and scored accordingly.  In a few cases, scans were not performed due to scheduling 
conflicts that resulted in a lack of samples, hardware, or repair patches.  In those cases, the 
response of a second device that was demonstrating similar capabilities was used to provide an 
engineering evaluation between the devices.  This allowed all of the standards and samples to be 
assessed and assigned a score. 
7.1.1 ISS PWRK System 
Three types of repair kits are available for application to the ISS pressure wall.  There are two 
U.S.-developed kits that are applied via IVA and one Russian-developed kit that is applied via 
EVA.  The IVA kits are designed for leaks that are less than 1 inch in diameter.  Any leak that is 
near the 1-inch diameter size would probably result in a module having to be closed off and 
allowed to depressurize.  In that scenario, the astronauts would need to employ the Russian EVA 
kit in order to seal the leak before repressurization.  After repressurization, the structural integrity 
of the interior wall could be addressed with NDE tools.  The Russian EVA patch would not 
interfere with application of the NDE tool because that repair patch is outside the ISS.  In case of 
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the IVA patches, the patches will interfere with the NDE tool, and test procedures need to deal 
with the presence of the patch. 
One IVA PWRK patch utilizes one or two layers of 0.013-inch thick aluminum tape.  The  
shape of the aluminum patch is circular with two aluminum “wings” on the outer edge (see  
Figure 7.1-1).  At the center of the patch is a ~1/8-inch-thick rubber pad that protects the  
center of the patch from any sharp metal surfaces that might exist at a leak location (see  
Figure 7.1-1(b)).  The patch is placed over the damaged wall, and the astronaut flattens the edges 
of the tape to make a pressure seal.  Because of the rubber pad at the center of the patch, the 
center will be significantly raised from the ISS pressure wall surface, which causes the tape 
surface to wrinkle.  NDE testing will require that the method either measure through the patch 
and handle signal artifacts introduced by the unevenness or measure under the patch from several 
inches away (~4 inches or more).  During some of the testing, the effects of the PWRK tape 
repair patch when imaging indirectly under the patch were emulated by employing a simple  
6-inch-wide strip of 0.013-inch tape over the test samples that had manufactured flaws in a 
straight line.  This simplified some of the testing, as the contact of the tape was the issue of 
concern for those tests. 
   
          (a)  Photograph of top side       (b) Photograph of underside (the red circle  
           is a rubber pad to protect the center of the patch 
                      from rough, torn wall surface  
Figure 7.1-1.  PWRK Tape Patch Mock-up 
The second IVA PWRK patch utilizes a circular metal plate with a polymer seal around the edge 
that seals the hole via the module pressure pushing against the vacuum of the underside of the 
patch (see Figure 7.1-2).  This type of patch will introduce a vacuum between the wall and the 
patch inner surface.  Any NDE process that requires couplant or air to transmit a signal through 
the region between the wall and the patch will not be viable with this type of patch.  EC methods 
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will have to transmit the electromagnetic field through the patch, the center of which might be 
~1/2 inch above the surface, as well as through the pressure wall to interrogate the pressure wall 
for defects.  Ultrasonic methods will need to send ultrasonic energy along the pressure wall from 
outside the patch to the area of interest under the patch that will be several inches away  
(~4 inches or more). 
 
Figure 7.1-2.  PWRK Plate Patch 
7.1.2 Test Standards and Samples 
The term “test standards” will be used to refer to machine-manufactured test objects.  Test 
samples will refer to test objects that are made by less exact operations, such as hypervelocity 
impacts. 
Standards 1A and 1B, which were rib-stiffened plates, represented a typical geometry from the 
Russian hardware with a small-rib wall separation (~3-inch square, 1/16-inch thin wall) (see 
Figure 7.1-3).  This wall type is found on the Russian SM (Zvezda) and FGB (Zarya).  In the 
case of the SM, the waffle pattern was on the inside of the module; for the FGB, the pattern was 
on the outside of the module.  Standard 1A had flaws generated on the waffle side of the plate, 
while Standard 1B had the flaws place on the smooth side.  To emulate cracks and pits in the 
FGB and SM standards, EDM notches 0.100 inch long and either 0.010 or 0.020 inch deep were 
manufactured.  To emulate pits, partial through-the-thickness holes were drilled with a  
3/64-inch-diameter drill to depths of 0.010 and 0.020 inch.  These flaws were mostly located 
adjacent to the ribs of the waffle pattern. 
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(a)  SM wall with manufactured flaws  
(red dots on left side are EDM notch 
locations; red dots on right side are partial 
through-the-wall hole locations) 
 (b)  FGB wall with manufactured flaws  
(red dots on left side are EDM notch 
locations; red dots on right side are partial 
through-the-wall hole locations 
Figure 7.1-3.  FGB and SM Style Rib-stiffened Walls  
For the U.S. ISS modules, there are large acreage areas with 3/16-inch thick walls, with widely 
spaced stiffening ribs.  Standard 2 was a flat aluminum 3/16-inch plate that contained a row of 
EDM notches two inches from one edge and a row of partial through-the-thickness holes  
2 inches from another edge (see Figure 7.1-4).  The EDM notches ranged from depths of  
0.025 to 0.125 inch and lengths of 0.032 to 0.094 inch.  The holes had diameters of 1/32 to  
3/32 inch and depths of 0.025 to 0.100 inch. 
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Figure 7.1-4.  Standard 4, with the Same Manufactured Flaw Pattern as in Standard 2 (red dots on 
right side are EDM notch locations; red dots along top side are partial through-the-thickness hole 
locations) 
Standard 3 represented a multisite damaged plate that was 3/16-inch-thick aluminum plate and 
had partial through-the-thickness holes placed in concentric circular patterns (see Figure 7.1-5).  
The outer circle (4-inch diameter) consisted of 24 0.031-inch-diameter holes ranging in depth 
from 0.025 to 0.125 inch.  Next was a ring (3-inch diameter) of 12 0.063-inch-diameter holes 
ranging in depth from 0.025 to 0.125 inch.  Finally, there was a ring (2-inch diameter) of  
12 0.094-inch-diameter holes ranging in depth from 0.025 to 0.125 inch.  With this sample, one 
could begin to understand the effects of multisite damage on the NDE signals and images. 
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Figure 7.1-5.  Standard 3, with Partial Through-the-wall Holes Organized as Three Rings  
around 1-inch, Large Flat-bottom Partial Through-hole at Plate Center  
Standard 4 mimicked Standard 2, except that the aluminum plate was only 0.063 inch thick 
(Russian hardware thickness).  In this standard, the EDM notches were either 0.100 or  
0.200 inch long with depths ranging from 0.005 to 0.040 inch (see Figure 7.1-4). 
Standard 5 mimicked Standard 3, except that the aluminum plate was only 0.063 inch thick 
(Russian hardware thickness) (see Figure 7.1-6).  In this standard, the holes were in the same 
patterns and diameters as for Standard 3, but the depths ranged from 0.005 to 0.040 inch.  
 
Figure 7.1-6.  Standard 5, with Partial Through-the-wall Holes Organized as Three Rings  
around 1-inch Large Through-hole at Plate Center 
Standard 6A and 6B mimics Standard 2, except that these test standards had an 84-inch-radius 
curvature in the aluminum plate (see Figure 7.1-7).  Plate 6A had the curvature parallel to the 
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row of EDM notches, while Plate 6B had the curvature parallel to the row of partial through-the-
thickness holes.  The purpose of this standard was to demonstrate the ability of the NDE method 
to correctly handle the curvature of an ISS module. 
 
Figure 7.1-7.  Standard 6A, which has the Same Manufactured Flaw Pattern as Created in 
Standard 2 (red dots on right side are EDM notch locations, and red dots along the topside are 
partial through-the-wall hole locations; Standard 6B is the same size, except that the EDM notches 
and partial through-the-thickness hole locations are transposed; the photo on the left side indicates 
the curvature of the plate) 
Standard 7A and 7B mimicked Standards 6A and 6B, except that the radius of curvature was 
more severe at 25 inches (see Figure 7.1-8).  The purpose of these standards was to demonstrate 
the ability of the NDE method to correctly handle the small radii of curvature found in some 
parts of the ISS modules. 
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Figure 7.1-8.  Standard 7B, which has the Same Manufactured Flaw Pattern as Created in 
Standard 2 (red dots on the left side are EDM notch locations, and red dots along the topside are 
partial through-the-wall hole locations; Standard 7A is the same size, except that the EDM notches 
and partial through-the-thickness hole locations are transposed; the photo on the left side indicates 
the curvature of the plate) 
Figure 7.1-9 is a photograph of an impact-damaged plate, numbered 186.  This plate had one 
small penetration and a small region of severe pitting, and the surface was also deformed. 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
28 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
 
Figure 7.1-9.  Backside of Impact Plate 186 (this plate shows one visible penetration, a region of 
deformation of the plate, and a small area of pitting)  
Figure 7.1-10 is a photograph of an impact damaged plate, numbered 1900.  This plate had one 
large penetration (>1 inch) and a large region of severe pitting; further, the surface was heavily 
deformed.  The penetration was in the form a large, long C-shaped crack. 
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Figure 7.1-10.  Backside of Impact Plate 1900, a 1/8-inch-thick Panel (this plate shows major 
cracking at the plate’s center; the whole center region is deformed, pushing away from the 
backside; and there is extensive pitting around the center regions)  
Figure 7.1-11 is a photograph of an impact-damaged plate, numbered 1907.  This plate had 
several small penetrations and a large region of pitting.  There were numerous small bumps 
corresponding to deep pits and the small penetrations.  The small penetrations often had small 
short cracks emanating from them.   
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Figure 7.1-11.  Backside of Impact Plate 1907 (this plate shows extensive pitting across most of the 
plate (~15-inch radius of debris damage); a few larger pits, seen as an arc across the photo, are 
actually minor penetrations in the form of short cracks) 
Figure 7.1-12 is a photograph of an impact damaged plate, labeled T3.  This plate had several 
small penetrations and a small region with severe pitting.  
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Figure 7.1-12.  Backside of Impact Plate T3 (his plate shows major pitting near the center of the 
plate; a few larger pits are penetrations through the plate) 
Figure 7.1-13 is a photograph of backside of impact plate 243.  This plate represents the FGB 
wall configuration and was impacted with a hypervelocity projectile on the waffle side of the 
plate.  There were several small penetrations, some of which are highlighted in red, as well as 
two major penetrations.  This plate shows major pitting near the center of the plate.  A few larger 
pits were penetrations through the plate.  The areas in between the waffle walls showed 
deformation. 
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Figure 7.1-13.  Backside of Impact Plate 243, which Represents FGB Wall and was Impacted with a 
Hypervelocity Projectile (the impact was performed from the waffled side of the plate; because of 
the thin wall, there are many small penetrations, some of which are highlighted in red, as well as 
two major penetrations; this plate shows major pitting near the center of the plate, and a few larger 
pits are penetrations through the plate; the areas in between the waffle walls show deformation) 
7.1.3 Testing Configurations 
7.1.3.1 Phased Array Ultrasonic Testing 
Phased array instruments are high-end ultrasonic testing instruments that allow significant 
flexibility in testing.  For the concepts of operations that were envisioned in this series of tests, 
there will be a repair patch covering the area of concern, as discussed in Section 7.1.2.  With 
ultrasonics, there will be a need to be able to inject ultrasonic energy into the pressure wall 
outside the repair area and have that energy travel in the pressure wall into the region of interest.  
This will be accomplished by having the array probe mounted on an “angle beam” block that will 
direct the energy in the direction desired (see Figure 7.1-14).  Many beam angles are available 
from an array probe, and those many angles are denoted in the figure as the array sector beam.  
Each single beam from the array probe will result in the beam being refracted at the angle beam 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
33 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
block to pressure shell interface, according to Snell’s Law.  If the component under test is thin, 
then each beam will be reflected repeatedly against the top and bottom of the pressure wall as it 
transmits toward the region of interest.  This concept will allow the ultrasonic energy to pass 
under a repair patch (denoted as a plate repair cross section in this figure) and to interrogate the 
region of interest.  In the case of the tape repair patch, the presence of the tape and adhesive 
causes additional attenuation at each reflection off the aluminum-to-tape interface. 
 
Figure 7.1-14.  Phased Array-angle Beam Block Probe Geometry for  
Scanning under a Patch Repair 
In ultrasonics, there are several imaging formats that are common.  The simplest format is called 
an A-scan.  An A-scan represents a graph where the time or horizontal axis is the depth into a 
part and the vertical axis is the signal strength.  
A second format is called a B-scan.  This type of image represents an image where one direction 
denotes the time of flight of the signal into the sample (or by knowing the sample’s speed of 
sound, the depth into the sample that the signal travels), while the other direction represents the 
spatial location of the probe.  In a sense, each scan location is like a separate A-scan, and all of 
the A-scans are being combined into a composite image.  The image color or shade represents 
the signal strength or amplitude of the A-scans.  Typically, a B-scan would show an image of the 
cross section of a part.  In Figure 7.1-14, the B-scan is an image made from one refracted/ 
reflected beam path as the probe is scanned along. 
A third format is called a C-scan.  In that imaging format, an x-y scan is made, and at each (x, y) 
position, the signal amplitude is computed (usually the maximum signal at that point).  For array 
probes, a zero-angle probe (see Figure 7.1-15) can be used to generate a C-scan by letting the 
probe length measure one dimension and scanning the probe in the perpendicular direction to 
produce a C-scan image that is as wide as the probe and as long as the scan dimension. 
A fairly new scan format, called a Top-scan, is possible with ultrasonic arrays.  This scan is 
presented in a B-scan format, but instead of utilizing a single beam path from an array sector 
 
 
 
 
  
Array probe 
Angle beam block 
Pressure wall 
crack 
One refracted/reflected beam path 
Array sector beam 
 
Plate repair cross section 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
34 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
beam (see Figure 7.1-14), a range of beam paths is used and averaged to produce a more stable 
image of the underlying structure.  Each ultrasonic device tested was equipped to display  
A-scans, B-scans, and C-scans.  Only one of the instruments tested supported the Top-scan 
feature, but it was considered a significant improvement for less skilled operators. 
For areas where the repair patch does not interfere with the ultrasonics beam path, in addition to 
the angle beam block a zero-angle beam can be used (see Figure 7.1-15) to produce a C-scan.  
Using this probe configuration, a direct thickness map of a damaged outer wall would be 
possible.  The advantage of this configuration is that wide swaths of the plate are measured at 
one time.  This method is also applicable to scanning of bond lines.  For both the B-scan and  
C-scan, when the probe is coupled with an accurate encoder wheel it is expected that an accurate 
map of the damage area will be possible.   
 
Figure 7.1-15.  Phased Array Zero-angle Beam Block Probe Geometry for  
Scanning Pressure-Wall Thickness 
Excellent tutorial materials for PAUT scanning are available at the Olympus knowledge Web 
page [ref. 6]. 
7.1.3.2 EC Testing 
EC technologies are attractive for use in metal pressure vessel structures, especially when the 
flaw is on the same side as the probe.  They do not require a couplant and have excellent 
sensitivity to vertical cracks at the surface.  For the case where the flaw is on the far side of the 
wall, the issue of radio frequency (RF) penetration is a concern.  Figure 7.1-16 illustrates this 
point, showing an EC probe and indicating the RF field depth of penetration.  RF penetration in 
metals can be limited.  Since the penetration is inversely proportional to frequency, operating at 
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low frequencies can allow some penetration through metal for detection of flaws on the far side 
of a part.  But, as the frequency lowers, the spatial resolution also declines. 
The ability to manufacture thin EC arrays on flexible substrates is one feature that is attractive 
for imaging purposes on the ISS.  Two of the units tested for this assessment were able to 
support array imaging, while the third device incorporated a rapid mechanical scanning system.  
C-scan styled images based on array probes or rapid mechanical scanning instruments increase 
throughput significantly. 
 
Figure 7.1-16.  EC Probe Geometry for Scanning near Patch Repair 
Tutorial materials for EC and EC array testing are available at the Olympus knowledge Web 
page [ref. 7]. 
7.1.4 Olympus Omniscan MX UT 
The OmniScan MX is an advanced, multi-technology flaw detector.  It offers a high acquisition 
rate and extensive software features in a portable, modular instrument to efficiently perform both 
manual and automated inspections.  One unique aspect of this device is that by exchanging a 
hardware module in the rear, this system has the ability to operate as either an ultrasonic phased 
array and conventional ultrasound system or, alternatively, as a conventional EC and EC array 
system. 
The system can run on batteries, direct current (DC) power, or 115 Volts alternating current 
(AC) power.  Setup is quick, with just a few connectors, some of which are keyed connectors.  A 
setup configuration file can be saved for use by others.  There is a memory port for a compact 
flash card, ports for a keyboard and computer mouse, and a video graphics array (VGA) output 
for displaying images on a separate terminal.  Data scans can be saved to memory.  There is an 
Ethernet connector for connection to a local area network (LAN).  Personal computer (PC)-based 
software exists to reanalyze data after it has been taken and stored.  There are several display 
modes that can be selected, such as phased array sector scans and conventional A-scan, B-scan, 
and C-scan; these can be shown in groups or individually.  Encoder wheeled systems are 
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available to track sensor position, which will help with defect sizing.  With a phased array 
sensor, only a single encoder wheel is required to make a two-dimensional B-scan. 
The system has physical menu buttons on the left and bottom sides (see Figure 7.1-17).  These 
buttons activate menu items on the screen.  There is a keypad and a click wheel on the right for 
setting values.  The keypad on the right also can be used to activate specific operation controls.  
The menu buttons often activate additional submenus, which may activate another layer of 
submenus. 
 
Figure 7.1-17.  Olympus Omniscan MX UT Model 
Figure 7.1-18 shows the results of scanning the simplest standard used in this testing, Standard 2.  
Figure 7.1-18(a) shows a linear B-scan across a row of notches, scanned from 4 inches away 
from the notches, while 7.1-18(b) shows a similarly configured linear B-scan across a row of 
partial through-the-thickness holes.  The black circles highlight the location of the EDM notches 
and the partial through-the-thickness holes in the images.  In a B-scan image, the reverberation 
of the signal causes the short horizontal lines that appear in the echo from a flaw.  Both of these 
scans were performed using an angle beam phased array setup.  In addition, the test standard also 
had a layer of 0.013-inch aluminum tape applied to the scanned area to emulate the effect of the 
PWRK tape patch.  For that scanning configuration, the tape caused between 6 to 10 dB of signal 
loss compared with the same scans without the tape present, where the reflections of the 
ultrasonic beam between the top surface and the tape were lossy.  Scanning with a PWRK plate 
patch or scanning without a patch had more signal-to-noise and sensitivity/resolution.  As can be 
seen, all of the holes and notches were detected with this instrument.  The smallest hole was  
1/32 inch in diameter and 0.025 inch deep.  The smallest notch was 0.032 inch long and  
0.025 inch deep.  This compares favorably with detection requirements specified under  
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NASA-STD-5009 for conventional scanning methods [ref. 4].  The signal form caused by the 
flaw in the figure represents the local reverberation pattern of the ultrasonic echo.  That pattern 
will shift around slightly for different beam angles, but the overall echo location should be 
constant. 
               
(a) Row of notches detected with layer of tape 
covering the area to emulate effects of PWRK 
tape patch 
 (b) Row of partial through-the-thickness holes 
detected with layer of tape covering the area to 
emulate effects of PWRK tape patch 
Figure 7.1-18.  Angle-beam Scans of Standard 2 (B-scan image representations show the distance 
the ultrasonic beam travels (Y-axis, with the top at y = 0 and the bottom at y ~ 4 inches) and the 
physical horizontal probe position (X-axis, 0 to 11 inches); the variations in the intensity represent 
the beam’s echo strength) 
Figure 7.1-19 shows a series of angle beam B-scans images made on Standard 3.  This panel 
represents multisite damage in the form of partial through-the-thickness holes (emulating pits  
in the material).  The holes were drilled in a series of concentric rings of holes, with the  
largest diameter holes in the inner ring and the smallest diameter holes in the outer ring.   
Figure 7.1-19(a) shows that all of the holes near the transducer are detected.  As the signal 
travels further along the plate, detection degrades in part due to interference from holes in the 
beam’s path as well as from signal diffraction and attenuation.  The black circle indicates a 
location where the location of a hole is uncertain.  Figure 7.1-19(b) shows the effects of placing a 
PWRK tape patch on the sample.  One of the small holes (0.031-inch diameter and 0.025-inch 
depth) was lost in the noise indicated by the black circle, while all of the remaining holes were 
still detected.  Figure 7.1-19(c) shows the detection of all of the holes in the full composite 
image, except for two small holes (one with a 0.031-inch diameter and 0.025-inch depth, and one 
with a 0.031-inch diameter and 0.050-inch depth), and one hole with a 0.063-inch diameter and 
0.025-inch depth.  This image shows that utilizing multiple scans can help capture a full image of 
the area under a patch. 
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(a) Image of partial through-the-thickness 
holes detected without a PWRK patch present 
 (b) Image of partial through-the-thickness 
holes detected with PWRK tape patch 
 
(c) Composite image using image from panel (a) and complementary image  
made from opposite side of tape patch 
Figure 7.1-19.  Angle-beam Scans of Standard 3 
Figure 7.1-20 shows a composite image of five 0-degree beam C-scans of Standard 3.  This 
image shows that this system can detect pits without the presence of a repair patch.  This would 
be the case for imaging hidden damage that extends beyond the patch repair area, which is 
common for some types of MMOD damage.  By setting certain imaging parameters, the C-scan 
can be set up so that the depth of the pits would be resolvable. 
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Figure 7.1-20.  Composite Image from Five Zero Beam C-scans of Standard 3 
Figure 7.1-21 shows an angle beam B-scan image of Sample 186, which shows an impact region 
that includes one penetration, deformation, and pitting in the region of impact.  The yellow and 
red signals represent the deepest damage regions, including the through-the-wall penetration.  
This type of scan does not allow specific differentiation of the damage type, whether it is a 
penetration or a pit, but it does allow location of damage.  The red circle highlights the 
penetration, and the black circles highlight regions of severe pitting. 
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Figure 7.1-21.  Angle Beam B-scan Image of Impact Plate 186 without Repair   
Figure 7.1-22 shows an angle beam B-scan image of impact plate 1907.  This plate had an 
extensive damage region with a few deep pits, some of which penetrated through the sample and 
are seen as the dark blue, yellow, and red colors in the figure, circled in red.  A smaller probe 
was useful for scanning this plate because of the uneven surface caused by some of the dents.  
The deepest dents are evident in the image in the proper position. 
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Figure 7.1-22.  Angle-beam B-Scan Image of Impact Plate 1907 without Repair  
Figure 7.1-23 is an angle beam B-scan image of impact plate 1900.  The top of the image 
represents the position y = 0; the bottom of the image represents a distance of ~4 inches from the 
probe.  This plate was 1/8 inch thick, the same as the Russian and U.S. hardware wall 
thicknesses.  It suffered broad area damage in the form of severe pitting, as well as a large crack 
at the center of the plate.  For this configuration, the pitting damage scattered the signal so 
strongly that the signal was quickly attenuated before it could travel the necessary distance to the 
center of the sample where a critical, large crack was located.  In this figure, the red, yellow, and 
green signals represent the severe pitting of the damage.  As the distance reaches about  
2.5 inches from the probe, the beam’s signal is falling into the noise, and damage is no longer 
being imaged clearly.  If the signal had not been attenuated, the critical crack would have been 
seen at the bottom of the scan.  The artifacts on the left side of the image are caused by the 
operator losing contact between the probe and the sample.  While a 0-degree scan can also image 
the severe pitting, it would be unable to image the center region under the patch because of the 
surface deformation.  It could only scan areas outside the patch area. 
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Figure 7.1-23.  Angle-beam B-Scan Image of Impact Plate 1900 without Repair 
Summary 
The OmniScan MX UT system demonstrated an excellent capability to measure the test samples 
that had manufactured flaws in 1/16-inch and 3/16-inch thick plates.  In 3/16-inch plates, the 
system detected EDM notches as small as 0.032 inch long by 0.025 inch deep and partial 
through-the-thickness holes as small as 1/32 inch in diameter and 0.025 inch deep on the far side.  
This included plates that had a curvature of radius as small as 25 inches.  In 1/16-inch plates, this 
system detected EDM notches as small as 0.100 inch long by 0.005 inch deep and partial 
through-the-thickness holes as small as 1/32 inch in diameter and 0.010 inch deep on the far side.  
It did have difficulty measuring small flaws adjacent to the ribs in the FGB sample using the 
angle beam array probes.  In those samples, the small flaws were detectable by manual scanning 
with a small, single-element angle beam probe operating at 10 MHz, which is a standard NDE 
procedure, but this does not fit within the concept of operations expected for on-orbit operations.  
This device was less successful in measuring the damage in the impacted plates.  If an impacted 
plate suffered extensive damage, that damage would interfere with the ability of this device to 
transmit its signal.  Furthermore, the nature of the signal quality in multisite damage found in an 
impacted plate interferes with the ability to specify the exact nature of the damage; that is, small 
cracks, pits, and small penetrations looked similar.  On the other hand, for modest damage, it was 
reasonably able to locate damage.  Finally, in the case of certification of bonded repairs in the 
pressure wall, this technology would be practical based on tests on the bonded sample flaws.  For 
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the Omniscan MX UT testing, these results were not saved for this report but were equivalent to 
the results for the Sonatest Veo (Appendix E).  The available results for the Olympus Omniscan 
MX UT system are shown in Appendix D. 
7.1.5 Sonatest Veo 
The Sonatest Veo Phased Array ultrasonic flaw detector is an advanced flaw detector with an 
easy-to-view visual display (see Figure 7.1-24).  The Veo’s simple controls are another notable 
feature.  The simple play, pause, record, and stop buttons are reminiscent of a video control 
remote or digital video disc controller, which is familiar to most people.  The menu setup is easy 
to follow, with only one level of menus.  The system has both a keypad and a click wheel on the 
left side for setting values.  The display is set up as a four-panel system with the ability to 
quickly step through the individual display panels and to expand or condense the panels.  The 
system can run on batteries or 115 Volts AC power.   
Setup is quick with keyed connectors.  A setup configuration file can be saved for use by others. 
There are universal serial bus (USB) ports for memory sticks, keyboard, computer mouse, and a 
VGA output for displaying images on a separate terminal.  Data scans can be saved to memory.  
There is an Ethernet connector for connection to a LAN.  PC software exists to reanalyze data 
after it has been taken and stored.  There are dozens of display modes.  One signal processing 
display that is unique and beneficial is the Top-scan, which the Omniscan MX does not provide.  
Top-scan is similar to a B-scan in presentation format, but it has the advantage of averaging 
many array sector angles together to give a much “smoother” view of flaws, while the B-scan by 
definition only presents one sector angle from the array probe.  While someone skilled in the art 
can use either display type to quantify a flaw equally well, the Top-scan may be easier for less 
skilled individuals to see and comprehend images.  Plus, more importantly, when saving the data 
from a Top-scan process, all the angles of data are saved and can be used for further processing 
later.  If one scan angle is not clear enough for a given purpose, another one might be far 
superior.  While this represents a great deal more data, it does allow someone on the ground to 
post-process the data and make adjustments to use angles that might provide better views of a 
flaw than what was originally estimated.  For on-orbit operations with subsequent ground-based 
evaluation, this is an advantage over the Omniscan MX UT instrument and is a significant 
finding.  The system comes with an encoder wheel to be used with the array probe, which will 
provide one of the scan dimensions seen in a B-scan or a Top-scan. 
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Figure 7.1-24.  Front Panel of Sonatest Veo System 
Figure 7.1-25 shows several scan views of Standard 2 in a Top-scan mode.  In each of these 
images, the probe is just beyond the edge of the tape at the top of the images.  The top of the 
figures represents y ~ 1 inch, and the bottom is about 4.5 inches from the probe.  Panel (a) 
represents a Top-scan of the row of partial through-the-thickness holes in the plate with 
0.013-inch aluminum tape on the surface (marked with circles).  The smallest hole  
(0.032 inch in diameter and 0.025 inch deep), marked by a red circle, is barely detectable 
(near the noise floor).  As was mentioned in the Omniscan MX testing, the tape added about 
6 to 10 dB of signal loss.  Panel (b) represents the same region shown as a composite image, 
made with the plate patch.  The increased signal gain that was lost in the tape patch is 
evident.  All of the holes were detected in that scan and are marked with circles.  Panel (c) 
represents a scan of the row of EDM notches in the plate with 0.013-inch aluminum tape on 
the surface.  The EDM notches are marked with circles.  The smallest hole (0.032 inch in 
diameter and 0.025 inch deep) is easily detected.  Panel (d) represents the same region shown 
as a composite image, but with the plate patch.  All of the detected notches in the scan are 
marked with black circles.  The one notch not detected is marked with a red circle and is the 
smallest notch (0.032 inch in length and 0.025 inch deep).  The variability in these images 
reflects the operator’s skill and shows that the flaw detection limit is at the 0.032-inch length 
and 0.025-inch depth.  In all these scans, the effects of the Top-scan imaging make for a 
more easily viewed image. 
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(a)  Holes with tape repair 
 
(b)  Holes with repair plate 
 
(c)  Notches with tape repair 
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d)  Notches with repair plate 
Figure 7.1-25.  Top-scan Images of Standard 2 
Figure 7.1-26 shows a series of angle beam Top-scan images made on Standard 3.  This panel 
represents multisite damage in the form of partial through-the-thickness holes (pits).  The holes 
were drilled in a series of concentric rings of holes, with the largest diameter holes in the inner 
ring and the smallest diameter holes in the outer ring.  Figure 7.1-26(a) shows that all of the 
holes near the transducer were detected.  As the signal traveled further along the plate, detection 
degraded, in part due to interference from holes in the beam’s path, and from signal diffraction 
and attenuation.  Figure 7.1-26(b) shows the effects of placing 0.013-inch aluminum tape on the 
sample.  One of the shallower holes (0.063 inch in diameter and 0.025 inch deep) was lost in the 
noise, while the remaining holes were detected.  Figure 7.1-26(c) shows the detection of all of 
the holes in the full composite image.  This image demonstrates that by utilizing multiple scans 
one could capture a full image of the area under a patch.  Figure 7.1-26(d) shows a composite 
image of three 0-degree beam scans of Standard 3.  This image shows that this system can detect 
pits without the presence of a repair patch.  This would be the case for imaging hidden damage 
that extends beyond the patch repair area, which is common for some types of MMOD damage.  
By setting certain imaging parameters, this C-scan can be set so that the depth of the pits would 
be resolvable. 
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(a) Angle beam Top-scan, scanning from 
right to left without any repair  
on Standard 3 
 (b) Same view as panel (a), except for the 
addition of the PWRK tape repair patch 
 
(c) Composite view, with one Top-scan operated from bottom to top and the other 
 in the reverse orientation 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
48 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
 
(d) A Composite view of 0-degree C-scan with ultrasonic energy traveling straight  
down into the sample and back out 
Figure 7.1-26.  Views of Standard 3 
Figure 7.1-27 illustrates that ability of these arrays to operate on curved surfaces.  When water is 
used as a couplant, the issue becomes whether the water layer can stay in contact with a curved 
surface and the probe as scanning is conducted.  The surface tension of water causes water to 
stick to both surfaces.  Another question is whether the curvature causes image degradation.  In 
Figure 7.1-27(a), the image indicates the ability to detect all of the partial through-the-thickness 
holes in the sample with the long axis of the probe in contact with the smallest curvature of the 
ISS pressure wall.  This image was made on the 25-inch-radius curvature surface with a PWRK 
plate repair.  Figure 7.1-27(b) shows the ability to image EDM notches with a WPRK tape repair 
in place.  Again, all of the holes were visible; hence, the system appears to be able to handle the 
25-inch curvature with adequate clarity. 
 
(a)  Images from Standard 7A holes with a PWRK plate repair 
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(b)  Images from Standard 7B EDM notches with a tape repair 
Figure 7.1-27.  Top-scan Images from a Curved Sample 
Figure 7.1-28 shows two image views of impact plate 186, which had a central region of 
damage, deformation, pitting, and one penetration.  Panel (a) was scanned in a bottom to top 
direction, while panel (b) was scanned from the opposite direction.  One of the images was 
flipped so that the orientation of the damage is the same in both images.  The circle highlights 
the region of the penetration.  The effect of the intervening damage regions modifies an image 
and is a strong argument for making multiple images from different directions to attain the most 
quantitative data. 
 
(a) Scanning from the direction bottom 
toward the top 
 (b) Scanning from the direction top toward 
the bottom 
Figure 7.1-28.  Angle Beam Top-scan Images of Impact Plate 186 
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Figure 7.1-29 shows an attempt to image damage in impact plate 1900 with a PWRK repair plate 
in place.  The image shows the limitation of the angle beam scans when trying to travel long 
paths with badly damaged surfaces.  In this image, the probe is at the bottom of the image with  
y ~ 1 inch at the bottom and y ~ 4.5 inch at the top of the image.  As a result of the strong 
scattering from the damage, the bottom of the image indicates significant pitting and damage, 
shown as the black and blue regions at the bottom; however, the ultrasonic beam has been 
strongly attenuated by the scattering, so it has failed to penetrate all the way to the center and top 
area, which contains a long critical crack-like structure.  Hence, there is no reflected signal 
making it back to the transducer.  The yellow signals at the top of the image represent weak 
signals. 
 
Figure 7.1-29.  Impact Plate 1900 with Plate Patch 
Figure 7.1-30 shows the Top-scan image results of impact plate T3, which has a local region of 
deep pits and a single penetration.  Rows and groups of deep pits were detected.  The deep pits 
are imaged as blue regions.  The penetration lies in the circled region. 
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Figure 7.1-30. Top-scan Image of Impact Plate T3 (image was scanned from left to right) 
Figure 7.1-31 shows one of the most difficult impact samples to scan with ultrasonics.  This 
panel is an emulation of the FGB skin.  The figure indicates several regions of damage, including 
two large penetrations.  The major difficulty with this sample was the presence of the rib 
structures, which caused large reflections.  If a scan was performed perpendicular to these ribs, 
the reflections were so large that they disguised any damaged regions while highlighting the ribs.  
The ability to image the rib patterns is helpful for understanding the orientation of the damage 
relative to the structure, but at the cost of detecting damage that is close to the ribs.  By scanning 
at 45 degrees to the ribs, most of the energy is lost in the reflections, and the reflections from the 
ribs miss the probe; thus, the important signals (i.e., those from the damaged areas) are greatly 
reduced.  The array probes do not have enough energy to penetrate to and reflect off the damaged 
regions.  By using a single-element angle beam transducer, a much larger pulser signal is 
allowed, which allows the signal to penetrate farther, but the flaw indications in the image still 
are not strong.  In Figure 7.1-31, indications that correspond to the damaged areas are 
highlighted.  The red circles indicate large penetrations.  The blue ovals are regions where 
extensive pitting and small penetrations exist.  
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Figure 7.1-31.  Impact Plate 243 (FGB Impacted Plate) (a single-element angle beam scan (B-scan) 
was made by scanning at 45 degrees to the rib structure; the damaged areas are identified with red 
circles (holes) and blue ovals (regions of pitting and small penetrations)) 
Summary   
The Sonatest Veo system demonstrated an excellent capability to measure the test standards that 
had manufactured flaws in 1/16-inch and 3/16-inch thick plates.  In 3/16-inch plates, the system 
detected EDM notches as small as 0.032 inch long by 0.025 inch deep and partial through-the-
thickness holes as small as 1/32 inch in diameter and 0.025 inch deep on the far side.  This 
included plates that had a curvature of radius as small as 25 inches.  In 1/16-inch plates, this 
system detected EDM notches as small as 0.100 inch long by 0.005 inch deep and partial 
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through-the-thickness holes as small as 1/32 inch in diameter and 0.010 inch deep on the far side.  
The system did have difficulty measuring small flaws adjacent to the rib in FGB samples using 
the angle beam array probes.  This device was less successful in measuring the damage in the 
impacted plates.  If an impacted plate suffered extensive damage, that damage interfered with the 
device’s ability to transmit its signal.  Furthermore, the signal quality for multisite damage that 
occurs on an impacted plate made determination of the specific nature of the damage difficult 
(i.e., small cracks, pits, and small penetrations looked similar).  While the system was not 
specific in identifying the damage type, in the case of modest damage it was able to locate the 
position of damage.  In the case of certification of bonded repairs in the pressure wall, this 
technology was practical based on testing on the bonded sample flaws.  Those results are given 
in Appendix E, in addition to other scan and evaluation information on the Sonatest Veo system. 
Finally, the Top-scan imaging modality was helpful for highlighting flaws and should prove 
beneficial to astronauts as a tool for visualizing whether a scan is being performed correctly; it 
should be helpful for post-processing as more scan data are saved. 
7.1.6 GE Phasor XS 
The GE Phasor XS is an ultrasonic phased array flaw detector (see Figure 7.1-32).  The Phasor 
has a series of buttons on the left and bottom side of the device face.  There is a click wheel for 
dialing in values on the left side.  The screen is smaller than the displays for the Veo and the 
Omniscan.  The menu operation is fairly straightforward.  The system can run on batteries or  
115 Volt AC power.   
Setup and hook up of the connectors is quick.  The array connector can be quickly snapped in 
place, as opposed to using threaded screws to anchor the plug.  As with the other systems, a 
setup configuration file can be saved for use by others.  There is a VGA output for displaying 
images on a separate terminal.  Data scans can be saved to memory.  There are fewer display 
modes, but the system does support a Top-scan capability similar to that of the Veo system.  An 
encoder wheel can be purchased to support B-scan and Top-scan capabilities.  
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Figure 7.1-32.  GE Phasor XS System 
One issue that was problematic for this testing was the limitation placed by the system on the 
range of the data that could be displayed.  The system would only allow the image to display out 
to five plate reverberations when using an angle beam transducer configuration.  This meant that 
the image display would cut off at less than an inch distance for a 3/16-inch thick plate (imaging 
was required out to a 4- to 6-inch distance to image under a plate patch).  By declaring the plate 
to be much thicker (i.e., 0.5 to 1 inch in thickness), the system could be tricked into displaying a 
longer distance, but the imaged flaws were badly distorted. 
Figure 7.1-33 shows a B-scan image result from scanning Standard 3, the sample with multiple 
partial through-the-thickness holes placed in concentric rings.  This image shows the distortion in 
the image that resulted from declaring the sample to be 1inch thick instead of its actual thickness 
of 3/16 inch.  While the scan shows several inches of the sample, it is a sufficient distance to 
fully image under a PWRK patch.  The distortions also smear out the edges of the holes, making 
sizing more difficult.  When the image was resized to make the indications circular, the holes 
appeared closer together than they actually were. 
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Figure 7.1-33.  A B-scan Image of Standard 3 showing the Results of Imaging the Multisite Partial 
Through-the-thickness Holes  
While the system was lacking in its ability to perform the type of angle beam scan desired, it was 
quite capable of performing 0-angle scans.  Figure 7.1-34 shows a 0-angle scan of Standard 3 
without any repair patch.  In this type of imaging, the detectability depends strongly on the 
phased array focal laws that are used for imaging and for ISS operations; ground personnel 
would provide these for the ISS crew.  This array focal law enhances the ability to cleanly detect 
major flaws.  The large diameter holes (0.094 inch) are easily detected.  In the next ring, some of 
the 0.063-inch diameter holes are detectable.  Those detected flaws correspond to 0.100- and 
0.125-inch deep holes on the backside.  None of the 0.031-inch holes can be seen in this image.  
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Figure 7.1-34.  A 0-angle C-scan Image of Standard 5 showing the Results of Imaging the Multisite 
Partial Through-the-thickness Holes without a Repair Patch to Block the Probe's Access to Flaws   
Figure 7.1-35 is a B-scan image of impact test plate 1907, which had several deep pits on its 
backside.  In this slice of the plate, two indications of deep pits are seen at the center and on the 
right side of the scan.  The echoes occur slightly above the strong back wall, indicating a 
measure of their depth (see white circles).  Shallow pitting on the backside of the panel was too 
small to detect in this image. 
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Figure 7.1-35.  A B-scan Image of Impact Test Plate 1907 showing the Results of Imaging the Pits 
Through-the-Thickness of the Plate without a Repair Patch   
Summary   
Strictly speaking, with the software limitations that were encountered with the GE Phasor XS, it 
would be difficult for this device to adequately measure any of the manufactured test plates that 
were generated with EDM notches and partial through-the-wall holes, as well as the impact test 
plates, in the manner required.  Although the system could measure thicknesses of samples, it 
would not be able to work in the regions under the PWRK patches, as required.  This technology 
would be practical for the bonded sample flaws.  No bond-line tests were recorded with this 
device.  The results for the GE Phasor XS system are shown in Appendix F. 
7.1.7 Olympus Omniscan MX EC 
This is the same unit that is displayed in Figure 7.1-17, except that this one has an EC module 
attached to the back.  The operation of this unit was similar to that of the ultrasonic version.  The 
graphical user interface (GUI) has a similar feel to the ultrasonic unit, except that the displays 
and operation menus are for an EC device.  Figure 7.1-36 shows an example of the display.  The 
best results from this device were obtained with a low-frequency array sensor (5 kHz), which 
was able to detect signals through nearly 1/8 inch of aluminum.  The following tests with this 
instrument were made with the 5-kHz array probe.  A C-scan of a multi-notch sample is used to 
calibrate the instrument for crack depth and liftoff effects.  The following C-scans show a top 
view of the average through-the-thickness EC results. 
Figure 7.1-36(a) shows an EC C-scan image of hidden partial through-the-thickness holes in 
Standard 4 without any PWRK patches.  All of the flaws are visible in that part of the scan: hole 
diameters from 1/32 to 3/32 inch and hole depths from 0.010 to 0.040 inch.  Figure 7.1-36(b) 
shows what happened with a 0.013-inch tape layer over the holes.  Figure 7.1-36(b) appears to 
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have shifted about 2 inches to the left from image (a).  All of the holes are visible; the two 
smallest holes, with 1/32-inch diameter and 0.020- and 0.030-inch depths are faint.   
 
(a)  Detected notches on Standard 4 without any patches 
 
(b)  Effect of application of 0.013-inch aluminum tape on the test plate 
Figure 7.1-36.  EC C-scan Images of Partial Through-the-thickness Holes in Standard 4 
Figure 7.1-37 shows an EC C-scan image of the EDM notches in Standard 4 without any PWRK 
patches.  The slots at depths 0.005 inch are at the noise floor of the scan.  All of the notches are 
identified with black circles.  In this standard, the notches are oriented horizontally, so one would 
expect that the images would be longer in the x-direction, but this type of probe caused the 
notches to appear longer in the y-direction.  It does not appear that the lengths of the notches 
were discerned well with this type of probe.  
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Figure 7.1-37.  EC C-scan Image of EDM Notches in Standard 4, showing the Detected Notches on 
Standard 4 without any Patches 
Figure 7.1-38 is an EC C-scan image of Standard 3, which is a thicker panel (Standard 4 is  
0.1875 inch thick).  The deep flaws are visible and are identified with black circles.  The center 
hole, which is 1 inch in diameter, only has 0.0875 inch of metal remaining (0.100-inch deep 
hole).  The deepest holes (0.125 inch) leave only 0.0625 inch of metal remaining.  In the first 
ring of holes (with diameters of 0.094 inch), there are three holes with a depth of 0.0625 inch and 
three holes with a depth of 0.0875 inch; these are seen in the correct orientation in the figure.  In 
the next ring, with 0.063-inch-diameter holes, two holes have a depth of 0.125 inch and two have 
a depth of 0.100 inch; these are seen in the correct locations in the second ring.  For the smallest 
holes (the outer ring, 0.063-inch-diameter holes) only two of the five holes with a depth of  
0.125 inch are seen as faint indications.  The other three holes are outside the scan dimensions.  
The 0.100-inch-deep holes are not seen at the 0.063-inch-diameter hole size. 
 
Figure 7.1-38.  EC C-scan Image of Partial Through-the-thickness Holes in Standard 3,  
showing the Detected Deeper Partial Through-the-thickness Holes on a Thick  
Test Plate (3/16-inch) without Patches  
Summary  
This lower frequency 5-kHz probe was obtained near the end of this assessment, and the NESC 
team did not have adequate time to pursue testing with this sensor, as would have been preferred.  
The earlier (100-kHz) probe, which this system had, was too high a frequency to work on even 
thin metal samples, which initially yielded null results on all of the test samples from this device.  
By using this lower frequency probe, the Omniscan MX EC system should be able to see the 
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deepest damage to some of the impact plates.  Thus, test plates Standards 2, 3, 6A, 6B, 7A, and 
7B can be scanned and the deepest pits would be detectable, but most of the shallower defects 
from those test panels were not deep enough for the 5-kHz probe to detect.  Further, the results 
would be affected by the surface flatness.  Bumps caused by deep pits would also have an effect 
on the image, which makes it unlikely that the system could give an unambiguous interpretation 
of the local wall thicknesses of the impacted plates.  Thus, this type of system would have less 
success when applied to an impacted plate because if the pits were deep enough to detect it is 
probable that there would be surface deformation.  
It should be noted that this EC array technology did not have good resolution of flaws when 
scanning near the ribs of a waffle structure.  The array probes used in this assessment have large 
elements compared with the more point-like probes used in conventional EC systems.  Finally, 
this technology would not be practical for the bonded sample flaws.  The results for the Olympus 
Omniscan MX EC system are given in Appendix G. 
7.1.8 UniWest 454A ECS3 
The core of the UniWest System is the 454A EC system.  As can be seen in Figure 7.1-39, the 
system was coupled to a mechanical scanner/encoder, which also houses a single small probe 
that spins around an approximately 1-inch wheel (the blue device at the lower left of the image).  
The 1-inch wheel can be partially seen at the far left bottom of the probe.  The outputs of the 
probe and the 454A unit (which is at the upper left) are fed into a computer to display the data 
(shown at the top right).  While the device has extra hardware to deal with, it is well constructed 
and not overly complicated to operate once set up. 
The US-454A is a portable, hand-held battery-operated multi-frequency EC instrument that can 
be connected to a laptop, PC, and motion controllers for use in semi- or fully automatic data 
collection applications.  Two encoder inputs enable position stamping of data.  Ethernet and USB 
capabilities allow instrument control along with time- and position-stamped data transfer to the 
client computer.  The 454A system is a widely used EC model that is robust.  For this testing, the 
ECS3 scanner used a 20-KHz probe that was operated in the 12 KHz regime.  
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Figure 7.1-39.  UniWest 454A ECS3 System with Laptop Computer, which Records Data and 
Displays Images 
Figure 7.1-40 shows that hidden EDM notches were detected on the far side of Standard 1B.  
The resolution is sufficient to detect the orientation of the flaws.  The rib pattern is easily seen in 
the top half of the image.  The top half of the image is the conductivity image, while the bottom 
half of the image is the probe liftoff image.  In these scans, the liftoff images should be uniform.  
In panel (a), white circles highlight the detectable flaws.  The flaws that are 0.010 inch deep and 
those in the corners of the rib patterns are of questionable detectability, while the 0.01-inch-deep 
notches along the ribs are detectable (on the right half of the image).  All of the 0.02-inch-deep 
notches (on the left side) were easily resolved.  Panel (b) is an image of the same region as in 
panel (a), but with 0.013-inch tape applied to the surface.  While the grid pattern might be 
vaguely discernible, none of the flaws can be resolved with any certainty.   
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(a) Detected notches (indicated with white circles) on Standard 1b without any patches 
 
(b)  Effect of application of 0.013-inch aluminum tape on the test plate 
Figure 7.1-40.  EC C-scan Images of EDM Notches in Standard 1B, the FGB Patterned Test Plate 
Figure 7.1-41 shows the ability to detect hidden partial through-the-thickness holes on the far 
side of Standard 1 (upper half of the image).  The resolution is sufficient to determine that these 
are circular flaws.  The rib pattern is easily seen.  In panel (a), flaws that are either 0.010 or  
0.02 inch deep are detectable and are outlined with white circles.  Panel (b) is an image of the 
same region as in panel (a), but with 0.013-inch tape applied to the surface.  Again, the grid 
pattern might be vaguely discernible, but none of the flaws can be resolved with any certainty. 
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(a)  Detected holes on Standard 1b without any patches 
 
(b)  Effect of putting 0.013” aluminum tape on the test plate 
Figure 7.1-41.  EC C-scan Images of Partial Through-the-thickness Holes in Standard 1B, the FGB 
Patterned Test Plate 
Figure 7.1-42 shows the ability to detect flaws on the far side of Standard 4, highlighted by white 
circles in the upper half of the image.  In panel (a), for this thickness (1/16 inch), the resolution is 
sufficient to determine that these are circular flaws.  All of the holes were detected down to sizes 
as small as 1/32-inch diameter and 0.010-inch depth.  In panel (a), flaws are 1/32, 1/16, or  
3/32 inch in diameter and range from 0.010 to 0.04 inch in depth.  Panel (b) shows the imaging 
of the EDM notches in this plate.  It is evident that these flaws are oriented horizontally, 
suggesting notches.  The notches that are 0.2 inch long are detectable down to 0.01-inch depth, 
while the 0.005-inch depth is not resolved.  For the 0.1-inch-long notches, the notches are 
detectable down to the 0.02-inch depth in this image. 
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(a) Detected partial through-the-thickness holes on Standard 4 without patches 
 
(b)  Detected EDM notches on Standard 4 without patches 
Figure 7.1-42.  Scans of Partial Through-the-thickness Holes and EDM Notches 
 in Thin Plate, Standard 4 
Summary   
Scans were completed with this UniWest system on thicker test standards with no detectability 
through the necessary 3/16-inch thickness.  Thus, test plate Standards 2, 3, 6A, 6B, 7A, and 7B 
were beyond capability of this system to address.  Similarly, the flat impacted plates were too 
thick to resolve the hidden damage.  This system would have had difficulty with uneven surfaces 
with this particular style of the scanner.  A scan of Standard 5 was attempted with a PWRK tape 
patch, with the scanner scanning along the sides of the center-raised area of the patch.  While the 
edges of the tape patch can be easily discerned, none of the hidden holes were resolved.  Finally, 
this technology would not be practical for the bonded sample flaws. 
Compared to EC array technologies, this type of scanner probe demonstrated better resolution of 
flaws, especially when scanning near ribs.  The array probes used in this study had rather large 
sensor elements compared with the small point-like probe typically used with this device.  The 
results for the UniWest® 454A/ECS3 system are given in Appendix H. 
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7.1.9 Jentek GridStation 
The Jentek MWM-Array GridStation used was a laboratory bench unit (see Figure 7.1-43).  
Jentek Sensors, Inc. is developing smaller models for portable use, but the model used in this 
testing was deemed adequate for demonstration purposes.  The MWM-Array is an inductive 
sensor and is based on the original MWM® developed at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in the 1980s [ref. 8].  A rapid multivariate inverse method converts the impedance 
data measured with an MWM-Array into images of surface geometry (from the liftoff response), 
stress and microstructure changes (based on the permeability response), and metal loss from a 
combination of the liftoff and wall thickness images.  While most EC devices are designed to 
work at high frequencies for the purpose of finding small surface cracks, the GridStation was 
designed to work at low frequencies. 
 
Figure 7.1-43.  Jentek GridStation MWM System 
Unlike conventional EC systems, the Jentek GridStation system uses precomputed grid/lattice 
databases, which are generated offline by Jentek using physics-based models of the sensor 
response for the material under test and stored for use by the GridStation software (see  
Figure 7.1-44).  The models are used to translate sensor impedance measurements into liftoff and 
conductivity data for the material under test with the conformable MWM EC sensors.  These 
results are then presented in a C-scan display.  A part of this measurement requires a preliminary 
(baseline) scan of a material to remove offsets and electronic and cabling effects.  This extra scan 
would need to be performed by the ISS crew on-orbit. 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
66 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
 
Figure 7.1-44.  Signal Processing Steps Used in Jentek GridStation MWM System 
The GridStation system that the NESC used during testing did not have an encoder with the test 
system.  In the following figures, scanning was performed by operating in a “time” mode 
(instead of using the encoder for position, the image position was advanced at a constant rate).  
By moving the array probe at a constant speed, a fairly consistent scan can be generated. 
The results of scanning Standard 1B (the FGB waffle plate with flaws) at a frequency of ~8 Khz 
are shown in Figure 7.1-45.  The array scan easily detected the regions that were 1/16 inch thick 
versus the thick rib structure, but it was unable to detect any of the EDM notches with this probe.  
That included notches that were 0.01 and 0.02 inch deep on the far side, away from the waffle 
ribs.  Even scanning at a 45-degree angle did not improve detectability.  The notches along the 
ribs were oriented at 0, ±45, and 90 degrees from the ribs, so angle presentation was not the only 
issue with detectability in this test.  In Figure 7.1-45(b), some of the holes were visible and are 
marked by white circles.  Away from the ribs, two holes, with depths of 0.02 and 0.01 inch, were 
detectable.  Also, along the ribs, the three holes that were 0.02 inch deep were detectable (those 
in the corners were more difficult).  One of the 0.01-inch holes along the rib (not located in a 
corner) was minimally detectable; the same size hole in a corner was not detectable.  None of the 
holes on the ribs were detectable, as the metal was too thick for penetration and sensing of the 
EC field from these flaws.  It appears that the proximity of the rib structure to the EDM notches 
had a significant effect on the EC sensitivity. 
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(a) Notches 
 
(b)  Partial through-the-thickness holes 
Figure 7.1-45.  Jentek GridStation EC C-scan Results from Scans on Standard 1B (the waffle grid 
pattern is fully visible in each figure; some partial through-the-thickness holes are detectable in 
panel (b), while EDM notches are not visible in panel (a); In both panels, there are two horizontal 
lines representing bad sensors in the linear array) 
Scans made on the thin flat Standard 4 (1/16 inch thick) are shown in Figure 7.1-46.  Panel (a) 
shows the detection of all of the small holes (1/32-inch diameter and 0.010- to 0.030-inch depth) 
(marked by white circles).  Panel (b) shows the detection of all of the holes (marked by white 
circles), except for the two smallest/shallowest holes (1/32-inch diameter and 0.010- and  
0.020-inch depth).  This image was flipped over to align with image (a).  The effects of the 
0.013-inch thick tape are evident as a fogging of the image, as well as some minor waviness in 
the image, which comes about because of the unevenness of the tape layer (creating an uneven 
liftoff situation).  
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(a)  View of plate without patches 
 
(b)  View of test plate with tape over test region, emulating the effects of a PWRK tape patch (the 
effects of the presence of the 0.013” aluminum tape are visible) 
Figure 7.1-46.  Jentek GridStation Results from Scans on Standard 4 of Partial  
Through-the-thickness Holes 
Scanning of the EDM notches in Standard 4 without a patch is shown in Figure 7.1-47.  The 
direction of the notches is evident in the longer length notches (0.200 inch) on the left side of the 
image.  For these 0.1- and 0.2-inch-long notches, only the 0.005-inch deep notches were missed.  
Notches 0.010 inch or deeper were detected. 
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Figure 7.1-47.  Jentek GridStation Results from Scans on Standard 4 of EDM Notches (partial 
through-the-thickness holes on right side of scan are also visible) 
Summary  
All of the PWRK plate repairs were beyond the capability of the Jentek GridStation system.  For 
the thicker samples, the RF signal was not able to penetrate the metal using the array probe and 
scanner frequency in this test.  Thus, test plates Standard 2, 3, 6A, 6B, 7A, and 7B were beyond 
the capability of this instrument.  Similarly, the flat impacted plates were too thick for this 
system to resolve hidden damage.  One of the waffle patterned impact plates was thin enough but 
was too rough for the probe to scan.  Finally, this technology would not be practical for the 
bonded sample flaws.  The results for the Jentek GridStation system are given in Appendix I. 
7.1.10 NDE Instrument Test Assessment  
Scoring for this NDE assessment was based on a score of 0, 1, or 2.  A score of 0 represented a 
failure to detect important features (signal-to-noise was very poor), a score of 1 indicated that 
some features were detectable but not many (signal-to-noise was poor), and a score of 2 
indicated that features were clearly detected (signal-to-noise was generally adequate).  This score 
was assessed per test article, which might involve the average of multiples scan attempts.  The 
following tables summarize the NDE scoring for the six units tested.  Note that in the following 
tables, Eng. Est. is shorthand for engineering estimate, which is based on knowledge or other 
scan information, as explained at the end of Section 7.1.  A table for each device (see  
Tables 7.1-1 through 7.1-6) lists the test panel’s scores and the summary scores. 
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Table 7.1-1.  Olympus Omniscan MX UT NDE Assessment Scoring 
Olympus Omniscan MX UT   
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0 Eng. Est. Impacted plate 186: 2  
NDE Standard 1B: 0 Not Saved Impacted plate 1900: 0  
NDE Standard 2: 2 Impacted plate 1907: 1  
NDE Standard 3: 2 Impacted Plate T3: 2  
NDE Standard 4: 2 Impacted Plate 243: 1 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 5: 2  
NDE Standard 6A: 2 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 123: 2 Not Saved 
NDE Standard 6B: 2 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 158: 2 Not Saved 
NDE Standard 7A: 2 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 028B: 2 Not Saved 
NDE Standard 7B: 2 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 132A: 2 Not Saved 
 
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard scans: 1.60  
Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 1.27  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 2.00  
 
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 1.62  
 
Table 7.1-2.  Sonatest Veo NDE Assessment Scoring 
Sonatest Veo      
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 186: 2  
NDE Standard 1B: 0 Not Saved Impacted Plate 1900: 0  
NDE Standard 2: 2  Impacted Plate 1907: 1  
NDE Standard 3: 2  Impacted Plate T3: 2  
NDE Standard 4: 2 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 243: 1  
NDE Standard 5: 2     
NDE Standard 6A: 2  Bond Plate 123: 2  
NDE Standard 6B: 2  Bond Plate 158: 2  
NDE Standard 7A: 2  Bond Plate 028B: 2  
NDE Standard 7B: 2  Bond Plate 132A: 2  
      
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard Scans: 1.60  
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Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 1.27  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 2.00  
      
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 1.62  
 
Table 7.1-3.  GE Phasor XS NDE Assessment Scoring 
GE Phasor XS      
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 186: 1 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 1B: 0 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 1900: 0 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 2: 1  Impacted Plate 1907: 0  
NDE Standard 3: 1 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate T3: 0 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 4: 1 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 243: 0 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 5: 1 Eng. Est.    
NDE Standard 6A: 1 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 123: 2 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 6B: 1 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 158: 2 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7A: 1 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 028B: 2 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7B: 1 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 132A: 2 Eng. Est. 
      
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard Scans: 0.80  
Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 0.15  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 2.00  
      
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 0.98  
 
Table 7.1-4.  Olympus Omniscan MX EC NDE Assessment Scoring 
Olympus Omniscan MX EC     
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 186: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 1B: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 1900: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 2: 0.67 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 1907: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 3: 0.67  Impacted Plate T3: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 4: 1.00  Impacted Plate 243: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 5: 1.00 Eng. Est.    
NDE Standard 6A: 0.67 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 123: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
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NDE Standard 6B: 0.67 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 158: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7A: 0.67 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 028B: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7B: 0.67 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 132A: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
      
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard Scans: 0.60  
Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 0.00  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 0.00  
      
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 0.20  
 
Table 7.1-5.  UniWest 454A ECS3 NDE Assessment Scoring 
UniWest 454A ECS3     
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0.00  Impacted Plate 186: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 1B: 0.67  Impacted Plate 1900: 0.00  
NDE Standard 2: 0.00  Impacted Plate 1907: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 3: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate T3: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 4: 0.67  Impacted Plate 243: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 5: 0.67 Eng. Est.    
NDE Standard 6A: 0.00  Bond Plate 123: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 6B: 0.00  Bond Plate 158: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7A: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 028B: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7B: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 132A: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
      
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard Scans: 0.20  
Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 0.00  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 0.00  
      
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 0.07  
 
Table 7.1-6.  Jentek GridStation NDE Assessment Scoring 
Jentek GridStation  
Test Article Score Notes Test Article Score Notes 
NDE Standard 1A: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 186: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 1B: 0.17  Impacted Plate 1900: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
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NDE Standard 2: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate 1907: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 3: 0.00 Eng. Est. Impacted Plate T3: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 4: 0.83 Impacted Plate 243: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 5: 0.33  
NDE Standard 6A: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 123: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 6B: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 158: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7A: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 028B: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
NDE Standard 7B: 0.00 Eng. Est. Bond Plate 132A: 0.00 Eng. Est. 
 
Average RATING amongst NDE Standard Scans: 0.13  
Average RATING amongst impacted plate scans: 0.00  
Average RATING amongst bond plate scans: 0.00  
 
Average RATING amongst three sets of scans: 0.04  
Table 7.1-7 lists the summary of the individual instruments results.  All six devices were high-
end, excellent NDE systems.  From an NDE point of view, the ISS is a challenging environment 
in which to work.  The concept of operations is not friendly to NDE equipment.  It was expected 
that the ultrasonic equipment would perform better than the EC equipment under the constraints 
of the concept of operations.  Still, there is some interest in having both types of instruments on 
the ISS to provide additional capabilities other than performing NDE of a structural repair after 
an impact.  Other potential needs could be addressed by this equipment.  Hence, this assessment 
provided an opportunity to evaluate both technologies for possible future requirements. 
Table 7.1-7.  Summary NDE Assessment Scores 
Model NDE Score 
Olympus Omniscan MX UT 1.56 
Sonatest Veo 1.56 
GE Phasor XS 0.98 
Olympus Omniscan MX EC 0.20 
UniWest 454A ECS3 0.07 
Jentek GridStation 0.04 
Based on the concept of operations and for the purpose of this assessment, the NDE capabilities 
of the Olympus Omniscan MX UT and the Sonatest Veo were both outstanding and showed 
significant potential for ISS operations.  The few differences noted between these units had a 
more significant impact on aspects of this assessment other than the NDE.  For example, as 
noted, the Sonatest Veo had an imaging modality denoted as Top-scan, unlike the Olympus MX 
system.  An expert in NDE testing would be able to reach a similar conclusion from either device 
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regarding the flaw, whether using a Top-scan or a B-scan, although a Top-scan gives a clearer 
image to untrained individuals. 
7.2 Operations/Astronaut Assessments 
7.2.1 Astronauts  
The astronauts were presented with each instrument and a simple one-page instruction for 
assembly and operations.  Although each COTS NDE instrument had different GUIs, menus, 
button layouts, and accessories, the overall astronaut feedback indicated that these instruments 
were roughly the same with respect to device complexity and ease of use.  They indicated that all 
devices performed similarly in categories of operation, setup, teardown, crew time required, crew 
training required, and stowage volume.  Ease of on-orbit operations will come down to having 
clear training videos and good procedures to operate any single instrument.  However, device 
complexity and ease of use should be secondary to the device’s overall function and performance 
(as evaluated by the NDE community).  But, if the Crew Office were to select a single COTS 
NDE instrument to fly to the ISS in the near future, the Sonatest Veo would be the preferred 
system.  This instrument was a favorite of several astronauts due to the combination of capability 
and good display imagery.  Further, from an NDE engineering standpoint it possesses a slight 
advantage over other ultrasonic phased array devices by utilizing assessment features such as 
multiple angle data acquisition (Top-scan). 
From a technology perspective, no showstoppers were identified.  Any of the evaluated COTS 
NDE equipment could be flown to ISS (pending typical certification requirements) and would 
provide NDE data.  The Crew Office participants felt that ultrasonic phased array devices 
provided more capability than EC devices since PAUT devices could scan across material where 
access might be blocked by the application of a pressure wall repair kit.   
The majority of the astronaut feedback centered on the operation of the NDE hand-held 
scanner/encoder.  Several different techniques and encoder configurations were evaluated with 
mixed results.  In all cases, the need was identified for a method to identify the specific area of a 
panel to be scanned.  The use of rulers, tape, Sharpie markers, and cameras were all potential 
suggestions to provide reference points, which would be necessary to obtain repeatable scan 
results.  Most crew members felt that using a guide or ruler increased scanning accuracy (see  
Figure 7.2-1). 
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Figure 7.2-1.  Scanning using a Metal Ruler as a Guide 
A variety of probes will be needed on the ISS.  A large probe is easier to operate but will not fit 
in confined areas of the ISS (e.g., behind racks and other secondary structures).  Therefore, a 
small probe will be required for these areas.  Also, an integrated probe that includes a 
combination of encoder and transducer would be beneficial, and fewer wires would minimize the 
scanning difficulties in a microgravity environment.  The use of a wheel encoder was met with 
mixed reviews.  Some crew members liked the wheel; others felt that it was a “definite no-go.”  
The apprehension with a wheel encoder was due to the spring-force required to hold the wheel 
against the pressure shell.  This action would require two hands, which is a difficult task in 
microgravity because one hand is required to brace the crew member while performing the scan. 
Most crew members felt that an optical or noncontact scanner would work better than the 
wheel/mechanical encoder.  Alternatively, a time-based scan could be used as a backup method, 
in the event that a mechanical encoder did not work in microgravity.  See Figures 7.2-2 through 
7.2-4 below for example probes and encoders used during the evaluation. 
 
Figure 7.2-2.  Ultrasound Array with Mechanical Wheel Encoder 
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Figure 7.2-3.  Large EC Probe with Mechanical Wheel Encoder 
  
Figure 7.2-4.  Large EC Probe (wheel encoder is housed in the blue casing) 
Several crew members recommended that the NDE operations concept should mimic that of the 
HRF.  The HRF system also uses crew-operated ultrasound scanners, but the output is relayed to 
the ground so that HRF engineers can provide feedback to the crew in real time.  This would 
provide the crew with an immediate response from NDE experts as to the quality of the scans. 
Preflight training should be kept to a minimum because there is only a minimal chance that crew 
will even need to operate this contingency-type equipment during their stay on ISS.  Once an 
event occurs that warrants the use of the NDE equipment (and all vehicle safing is complete), the 
crew can train on the NDE equipment using on-orbit resources.  The on-orbit resources should 
include video and computer-based training, clear procedures, and a few reference samples for 
crew to practice scanning. 
The majority of crew members felt that PAUT devices provided greater capability than the EC 
devices because PAUT devices can scan sideways across material where access might be 
blocked by application of a pressure wall repair kit.  A device with the ability to perform both 
types of scans might provide the most benefit to ISS.   
The Crew Office agreed that the NDE instruments that were evaluated during this assessment 
can potentially assist in evaluating the degree of damage sustained to ISS primary structures after 
an MMOD impact.  The ISSP should continue to develop this capability for use on ISS.  The 
astronaut’s assessment report is given in Appendix J. 
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7.2.2 Operations 
After testing, each device was scored against the others in each category using a five-point scale.  
The points were weighted and added to produce a final score for each device, which could be 
used as a quantitative measurement to make an operations recommendation.  The operations 
recommendation should be used in conjunction with the engineering recommendation in 
determining which specific device to use on the ISS. 
Most of the devices required a similar amount of crew interaction to take measurements.  All of 
the devices required 100-percent crew attention to take measurements, so none were simple in 
that regard.  Setup and tear down time for each device was similar, but none were extremely 
difficult to set up.  Each device required only a couple of simple plug-in connections, and each 
system required a simple water spray as a coupling medium.  The Uniwest system requires a 
second, dedicated laptop to make measurements, so it received a lower score than the others in 
this category.  
Some astronauts commented on their preference for the use of water for an ultrasonic couplant as 
opposed to the use of materials such as sonagels (used in medical ultrasound testing) or grease.  
Water is readily available and is easy to clean up.  It has good surface tension for sticking to the 
metal wall and is easy to handle on-orbit.  For operational purposes, other materials add extra 
burden to monitor and maintain as a supply.  
Expertise required by the crew was the area where the NESC team noted differences between 
devices.  Some devices had easy-to-navigate user interfaces (UI), fewer buttons, and easy-to-load 
configuration files; these received the highest scores in this category.  Other devices had UI 
menus that were more difficult to navigate or did not have a good method for loading 
configuration files.  For on-orbit NDE work, the astronauts would be trained using a video or 
computer-based training (CBT) program in addition to several practice runs with the instrument 
to obtain immediate experience with the operation of the system.  As mentioned previously, a 
common recommendation from the astronaut testers was to follow the HRF model for doing 
body ultrasound imaging.  Operations personnel felt that each device tested could be operated in 
this manner.  Adopting this operations model could allow crew members to get away with much 
less training to effectively take measurements. 
Each device uses a small, handheld sensor array, which can be attached to a mechanical wheel 
encoder.  Only the phased array ultrasound devices were successful in generating images around 
either of the leak repair patches.  Ultrasonic phased array sensors can send a shear wave through 
the module wall, whereas the EC devices can only image straight down underneath the probe 
footprint.  Therefore, the straight down scanned image is affected by the presence of both the 
PWRK rigid dome patch and the flexible tape patch.  While EC imaging serves an important 
purpose in the NDE assessment, from an ISS operations perspective if the device cannot measure 
underneath a patch it should not be considered for this purpose. 
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None of the probes were small enough to operate under racks and fixed structures.  Some 
modifications will be required for accessibility issues.  
All of the devices had similar power requirements, which can be accommodated on ISS. Most of 
the devices had the ability to export video using VGA connections, and most had an Ethernet 
connection or USB compatibility. 
In terms of number of crew members required and overall device size, all of the devices were 
nearly identical.  The Omniscan model also was capable of doing ultrasound and EC scans, by 
simply swapping a control module out of the back of the main unit and connecting a different 
probe, although this would require additional equipment.  Unfortunately, the Omniscan MX unit 
is now obsolete, and the new Omniscan MX2 model does not support this capability.  The 
operations assessment report is given in Appendix K. 
7.2.3 Operations/Astronaut Scoring 
For scoring, only five of the six devices were available for evaluation at the time that the 
astronauts and operations personnel were available.  The Jentek GridStation arrived later.  The 
NESC team decided that if testing of the GridStation indicated the device might be a viable 
alternative, efforts to have astronauts and operations personnel return to the lab and make 
additional assessments would be pursued.  In the end, the NDE assessment did not warrant 
further astronaut/operations evaluation of this device (Table 7.2-1 summarizes the results).  The 
Sonatest Veo had the highest score (3.5), followed by the Omniscan MX UT system (3.15). 
Table 7.2-1.  Summary Operation Assessment Scores 
    
Option 1 
Omniscan 
MX (PAUT) 
Option 2 
Omniscan 
MX EC 
Option 3 
GE Phasor 
XS (PAUT) 
Option 4 
Sonotest 
VEO 
(PAUT) 
Option 5 
Uniwest 
ECS-3 
(EC) 
Criteria W
ei
gh
ts
 
Sc
or
e 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Sc
or
e 
Sc
or
e 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Sc
or
e 
Sc
or
e 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Sc
or
e 
Sc
or
e 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Sc
or
e 
Sc
or
e 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Sc
or
e 
NDE Crew Time for 
Measurements 20 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.2 
Setup/Tear Down Time 20 3 0.6 3 0.6 3 0.6 3 0.6 2 0.4 
NDE Expertise/Training 
Required by Crew 20 4 0.8 2 0.4 3 0.6 5 1 2 0.4 
Preventive/Calibration/ 
Upkeep Actions 10 4 0.4 4 0.4 3 0.3 5 0.5 4 0.4 
Access Requirements 10 4 0.4 1 0.1 3 0.3 5 0.5 2 0.2 
ISS Interfaces 10 4 0.4 4 0.4 4 0.4 4 0.4 3 0.3 
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# Crew Required 5 3 0.15 3 0.15 3 0.15 3 0.15 3 
0.1
5 
Size (Storage and Access 
Impacts) 5 4 0.2 4 0.2 3 0.15 3 0.15 3 
0.1
5 
  
10
0 27 3.15 22 2.45 23 2.7 29 3.5 20 2.2 
7.3 Engineering Assessments  
As pointed out in Section 6.2.1.3, only the top three contenders based on the results from the 
other two assessment groups were subjected to engineering assessments.  These tests included 
EMI radiated emissions and susceptibility, power inverter compatibility testing, thermal analysis, 
materials analysis for off-gassing, and high-level safety analysis.  
7.3.1 EMI Radiated Emissions and EMI Susceptibility 
Each unit was tested for U.S. radiated emissions (RE02), Russian radiated emissions (Russian 
RE), and radiated susceptibility (RS03).  The hardware layout for each unit remained the same 
throughout all three tests. 
The radiated RF emissions tests identify frequency bands between 14 kHz and 15.5 GHz within 
which the units may introduce excessive RF noise that may interfere with other systems.  The 
radiated susceptibility test identifies any frequency bands between 121 MHz and 15.6 GHz in 
which RF emissions from existing hardware may interfere with a unit’s operation. 
For the Omniscan MX unit, there were ten emission failures in the horizontal polarization of the 
RE02 testing in the frequency range of 280 to 600 MHz.  The failures occurred while the unit 
was powered on and running.  The largest margin was 8.385 dB at 440.200 MHz (see  
Figure 7.3-1).  Note that in Figures 7.3-1 through 7.3-4, failures are indicated when the data 
exceeds the purple limit line. 
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Figure 7.3-1.  RE02: OmniScan MX, Hardware Powered On 
For the Sonatest Veo unit, there were 32 emission failures in the horizontal polarization of RE02 
in the frequency ranges of 300 to 700 MHz and 1000 to 1365 MHz.  There were also six failures 
in the vertical polarization of RE02 in the frequency range of 1186 to 1365 MHz.  The failures 
occurred while the unit was powered on and running.  The largest margins were 13.189 dB at 
1200 MHz (horizontal) and 6.559 dB at 1200 MHz (vertical) (see Figure 7.3-2). 
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Figure 7.3-2.  RE02: Sonatest VEO, Hardware Powered On 
For the UniWest 454A ECS3 system, there were five failures in the horizontal polarization of 
RE02 in the frequency range of 450 to 700 MHz.  There were also 21 failures in the vertical 
polarization of RE02 in the frequency range of 0.0185 to 21 MHz.  The failures occurred while 
the unit was powered on and running.  The largest margins were 2.273 dB at 451.6 MHz 
(horizontal) and 13.38 dB at 0.06 MHz (vertical) (see Figure 7.3-3). 
The configuration with AC powered on and equipment under test (EUT) powered off was also 
tested.  This configuration had five failures in the vertical polarization of RE02 in the frequency 
range of 0.42 to 0.66 MHz.  The largest margin was 5.29 dB at 0.66 MHz (see Figures 7.3-3 and 
7.3-4). 
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Figure 7.3-3.  RE02: UniWest, Hardware Powered On 
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Figure 7.3-4.  RE02: UniWest, AC Power On, EUT Off 
Expected impacts from the various frequencies were measured by the three instruments. 
The spurious emission at 400 MHz is close to several ISS RF systems: 
a. 0.5 MHz from the COTS ultrahigh frequency (UHF) communication unit (CU)  
(400.5 MHz) 
Interference is expected for this system.  Coordination may be required because the 
receiver’s noise spectral density (NSD) is degraded more than 9 dB by the interferer’s 
Power Spectral Density (PSD). 
b. 0.575 MHz from CU Version 2 (V2) (400.575 MHz) 
Because the receiver’s NSD is degraded more than 11 dB by the interferer’s PSD, 
interference is expected for this system.  Coordination may be required. 
c. 0.6 MHz from the wireless video system (WVS) UHF command link (400.575 MHz) 
The emission is in the bandwidth of the WVS command link.  The interferer’s PSD is 
much greater than the WVS NSD; therefore, interference is possible. 
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The spurious emission at 1226 MHz is close to the following ISS RF system: 
a. 1.6 MHz from the global positioning system (GPS) L2 (1227.6 MHz) 
Because the received interferer’s PSD is close to 20 dB higher than the effective 
receiver’s NSD, interference is possible. 
The spurious emission at 400 MHz is also close to several ISS RF systems: 
a. 0.1 MHz from the SM global timing system (GTS) (400.1 MHz) 
The receiver for GTS at this frequency is on the ground, so no interference is expected. 
b. 14.2 MHz from the space-to-space communication system (SSCS) (414.2 MHz) 
The emission is outside the intermediate frequency (IF) band pass filter, so no 
interference is expected. 
c. 0.18 MHz from the Global Awareness Data-exfiltration International Satellite (GLADIS) 
(400.18 MHz) 
The receiver’s beam is very narrow, so no interference is expected. 
The spurious emission at 407.7 MHz is close to the following ISS RF system: 
a. 9.4 MHz from SSCS (417.1 MHz) 
The emission is outside the SSCS IF band pass filter, so no interference is expected. 
The spurious emission at 440.2 MHz is close to several ISS RF systems: 
a. 3.7 MHz from the Functional Cargo Block (FCB) Sirius Radio (436.5 MHz) 
The receiver’s bandwidth is 1.2 MHz, so no interference is expected. 
b. 9.8 MHz from SM GTS (449.9875 MHz) 
The receiver on the ISS has a very narrow band, so no interference is expected. 
c. 3.7 MHz from the SM Amateur Radio on ISS (ARISS) (436.5 MHz) 
The ARISS is a voice system, which has a very narrow bandwidth, so no interference is 
expected. 
7.3.2 Power 
The power inverter compatibility test was performed to evaluate in-rush current and steady-state 
power draw.  The test also verified that the COTS NDE unit was compatible with the ISS power 
inverter. 
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The values recorded below were taken during the power inverter compatibility test performed in 
the Power Quality Laboratory at JSC with a 120 V power inverter. 
For the OmniScan MX the power and current values were: 
x Steady-state power = 22 watts 
x Maximum in-rush current = 17.34 A (absolute value) 
x The OmniScan MX was also informally tested with a 28 Volt inverter, which is the 
desired power supply for operating within the Russian segments.  An A31p 28 V Emerald 
Brick DC voltage converter was tested as a backup option.  The unit functioned normally 
with both power supplies. 
For the Sonatest VEO, the power and current values were: 
x Steady-state power = 22 watts 
x Maximum in-rush current = 35 A 
x The Sonatest VEO was not tested with the 28-Volt inverter due to scheduling conflicts, 
but no issues are expected. 
7.3.3 Thermal Analysis 
A thermal analysis was performed to evaluate how well the units might operate in an 
unpressurized module.  This would be a worst-case scenario, where an astronaut would have to 
suit up to work in the unpressurized module. 
The thermal analysis used the steady-state power draw obtained from the power inverter test and 
the sink temperature range of either 40 or 140 °F (suggested by the experts in the Active Thermal 
Controls Group at JSC) to determine the amount of heat that was generated by the units 
themselves. 
Little was known about the specific layout or contents of either unit; therefore, the following 
assumptions were made to obtain a basic analysis of each unit’s thermal behavior in a vacuum: 
1. The infrared emissivity of the outer surface of each unit was 0.8.  This number is 
characteristic of nonmetallic paints, most anodized aluminum, beta cloth, plastic, and dull 
nonmetallic surfaces. 
2. The specific heat of each unit’s materials was 0.2 Btu/lb-°F. 
3. The initial temperature of each unit was 75 °F. 
4. The heat is transferred out of each unit strictly by thermal radiation (because it is in a 
vacuum) to a constant sink temperature of either 40 or 140 °F. 
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5. The surface area of each unit was based on the dimensions shown in the respective user 
manual specifications:  Omniscan, 12.6 inches × 8.2 inches × 5.0 inches; Sonatest Veo,  
8.66 inches × 13.19 inches × 4.52 inches. 
6. The mass of each box was taken from the respective specifications given in the user’s 
manuals:  Omniscan, 10.1 lbm; Sonatest with one battery, 11.6 lbm. 
7. The 22-watt heat load measured from the power inverter test was evenly distributed over 
the outer dimensions of each unit. 
Using these broad assumptions, it was modeled to show that the units generated about the same 
amount of heat (see Figure 7.3-5).  However, the Sonatest VEO uses a fan for cooling, but the 
OmniScan MX does not use a fan.  Thus, in a vacuum environment, the OmniScan may perform 
somewhat better.  Both units will work during a cold cycle when the ISS is out of the sun for an 
extended period of time.  Neither unit will operate for long in a hot cycle when the ISS is in the 
sun for an extended period of time.  During a hot cycle, the units will exceed touch temperature 
within 30 minutes. 
 
Figure 7.3-5.  Thermal Analysis Results 
7.3.4 Material Evaluation: Off-gassing Analysis 
A materials analysis was requested to ensure that no off-gassing from the units could be deemed 
harmful to people or equipment.  Unfortunately, only minimal materials information was 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00824 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Independent Assessment of Instrumentation  
for ISS On-orbit NDE 
Page #: 
87 of 96 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00824, Volume I 
available from the vendors at the time of this assessment.  Because of the invasive nature of an 
actual off-gas test, off-gas tests could not be run since two of the pieces of equipment that were 
used for this part of the assessment test were rented.  Instead, a material’s evaluation by analysis 
was performed based on the information that could be discerned from product data sheets and 
visual inspections of the hardware. 
The Omniscan MX model did present a potential off-gas issue because of the rubber materials on 
the casing.  The large rubber bumpers on the corners would not pose an issue, but the entire front 
panel interface uses rubber buttons.  This rubber could be removed, or the rubber components 
could be redesigned. 
7.3.5 Safety Analysis 
Basic hazards were examined prior to and during each test.  No sharp edges or pinch points were 
found.  The units are durable and were designed to withstand falls and other impacts, so there 
were no concerns about parts of the units shattering.  During EMI susceptibility testing of the 
UniWest system, the device emitted very high levels of RF energy from one side of the box, 
which interfered with the RF susceptibility instrumentation.  While this test is a reliability test, 
the high levels of RF emitted by the UniWest system were concerning enough to cause this to be 
listed as a possible safety issue.  More testing would be required to complete the EMI 
susceptibility and to verify the emissions and their potential as a safety issue. 
A full safety analysis would be required for certification. 
7.3.6 Engineering Summary 
EMI testing was performed on the Omniscan MX UT, the Sonatest Veo, and the UniWest 454A 
ECS3 models.  In addition, the EMI testing was also performed on the Omniscan MXII model 
that will replace the Omniscan MX system.   
The Omniscan MX unit suffered a modest ten EMI RF exceedances, which appeared to be 
frequencies that could be handled by waiver processes.  The Omniscan MXII model proved to be 
better, with only one exceedance.  The Omniscan MX model presented a potential off-gassing 
issue.  However, potential off-gassing risks could be mitigated by additional procedures, such as 
bake out. 
On the other hand, to certify the Sonatest VEO, the ISS spectrum analysis team would need to 
assess the impact of the exceedances of this device with the ISS GPS in the frequency range at 
which an exceedance near 1.2 GHz arose during RE02.  If the ISS spectrum analyst determines 
that interference is possible, an operational work around may be possible by limiting the 
operation of the device during critical periods, which would minimally impact the certification of 
this product.  Additional invasive methods could involve coating the interior of the enclosure 
with an EMI spray, adding another clear panel over the liquid crystal display screen, replacing a 
component, adding shielding around a specific section of the box, or designing an entirely new 
enclosure.  However, it was not deemed conclusive that the potential frequencies of interference 
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would actually impact the GPS.  Further analysis will need to be performed to verify potential 
interference issues. 
Each element was scored on a scale where zero was the lowest performance score and five was 
the highest.  The various test elements were weighted so that the weighted net score also ranged 
from 1to 5.  Table 7.3-1 shows the evaluation scores and the resulting engineering score.  The 
ratings for the Omniscan MX UT and the Sonatest Veo were equal.  The Engineering 
Assessment Report is provided in Appendix L. 
Table 7.3-1.  Summary Engineering Assessment Score 
  
Option 1 
OmniScan MX 
(PAUT) 
Option 2 
Sonatest VEO 
(PAUT) 
Option 3 
UniWest ECS-3 
(EC) 
Criteria Weight Score Weighted Score Score 
Weighted 
Score Score 
Weighted 
Score 
EMI 25 4 1 3 0.75 4 1 
Power Inverter 
Compatibility 15 5 0.75 5 0.75 0 
Thermal Vacuum 
Analysis 10 2 0.2 2 0.2 0 
Materials Off-Gassing 25 3 0.75 4 1 0 
Safety 25 5 1.25 5 1.25 4 1 
100 19 3.95 19 3.95 8 2.0 
7.4 Assessment Summary 
Table 7.4.1 summarizes the results of this assessment.  The scoring was based on the following 
process.  Both the engineering assessment and the operations/astronaut assessment were 
considered strong cost drivers.  The engineering assessment is coupled to certification issues, 
which would incur costs before a system is launched.  In the same manner, operations represent 
costs to the Program after a system is launched, in the form of astronauts’ time and ground 
support costs.  For this assessment, these scores were viewed as equally weighted.  These two 
scores were added together to obtain a composite score that represented the overall “expense” or 
“cost impact” of each system.  Generally, higher scores in both areas reflected lower cost impact 
to the Program.  In contrast, the NDE assessment component score represented the more 
fundamental issue of how well a device performed the NDE on-orbit, which is not so much a 
cost issue as a mission-success factor.  Thus, the NESC team multiplied that score by the cost 
impact score to obtain a general score that reflected both cost and mission-success impact.  With 
this scoring process, a device that was able to succeed in its mission but had high associated 
costs would have a low score, and a device that was able to succeed in its mission but had low 
associated would have a higher score.  Thus, the net score would indicate the device that was less 
expensive for the Program but still met the requirements.  If a device failed to meet the mission 
requirements, then its score would be low, eliminating the device from consideration. 
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Table 7.4-1.  Final Summary Assessment Scores 
Model NDE Score Ops/Astro. Score 
Eng. 
Score 
Net 
Score 
Olympus Omniscan MX UT 1.62 3.15 3.95 11.50 
Sonatest Veo 1.62 3.5 3.95 12.07 
GE Phasor XS 0.98 2.7 N/A 2.65 
Olympus Omniscan MX EC 0.2 2.45 N/A 0.49 
UniWest 454A ECS3 0.07 2.2 2 0.29 
Jentek GridStation 0.04 N/A N/A 0 
In Table 7.4.1, an entry of “N/A” indicates that a device was not fully evaluated.  For example, 
the Jentek GridStation was received late in the testing phase and missed the window of time for 
the operations and astronaut assessment.  Still, the NDE score was not encouraging for this 
device (as all of the EC systems earned low NDE scores).  Based on the NDE scores and the 
operations/astronaut scores, the decision was made to complete testing only on the Olympus 
Omniscan MX UT, the Sonatest Veo, and the UniWest 454A systems.  Because the Omniscan 
MX and the Sonatest Veo units were far ahead of the GE Phasor, the NESC team decided to test 
only those two ultrasonic arrays.  The NESC team decided to apply the engineering assessment 
evaluation to at least one EC system so there would be some knowledge to answer future 
questions if EC technology should become important to the ISS.  Therefore, the NESC team 
selected the UniWest system, which was the leader at the time of this assessment.  Further, a new 
array probe and updated software for the Omniscan MX EC system was not obtained until 
testing was nearly completed.  The UniWest system is a widely used EC device.  Should the 
Program need to fly an EC unit at some point, this device could be considered for flight 
applications; the results of this assessment provide NASA with some engineering information 
regarding at least one EC system for future reference. 
The scoring results closely correlate with the NESC team’s overall evaluation of these devices.  
Based on all three assessments, both the Olympus Omniscan MX UT and the Sonatest Veo were 
the best NDE devices given the specific need.  Both systems performed equally well on the NDE 
and engineering assessments; the Sonatest Veo was the preferred system based on the 
operations/astronaut assessment.  The costs for the two devices were comparable; thus, the 
scoring reflected this preference.  However, should one of these two systems were to prove 
problematic to certify for launch, the other system would be a suitable alternative, although the 
operational issues would need to be considered since that evaluation favors one device over the 
other, which could result in a significant impact to this recommendation. 
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8.0  Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
8.1  Findings 
The following NESC team findings were identified: 
NDE Testing 
F-1. The NDE systems evaluated were sensitive to detecting structural features, such as 
isogrid webs. 
F-2. The systems evaluated were unable to detect damage directly adjacent to the isogrid web 
under a PWRK patch. 
F-3. PAUT systems were more capable than EC array/scanner systems in detecting and 
assessing damage to the manufactured test plates from simulated MMOD impacts with 
the PWRK patches in place on ISS pressure wall specimens.   
a. The Sonatest Veo and Olympus Omniscan MX-UT systems performed equally, 
while the GE Phasor had software limitations.   
F-4. The Sonatest Veo Top-scan process saves the data from different inspection angles, 
allowing additional analysis of the results on the ground.  
Astronaut/Operations Testing 
F-5. Astronauts, without any additional training, were able to quickly assemble and operate 
the NDE instruments evaluated using simple one-page procedures. 
F-6. The need for an additional computer for image display, as required by the UniWest 454A 
EC system with the ECS3 scanner, was deemed more complicated than desirable for on-
orbit operations. 
F-7. Spring-loaded position encoders used in a zero-G environment will require a reaction 
force to keep the sensor in contact with the part undergoing inspection, which will 
complicate operations. 
F-8. The probes/scanning components of NDE systems evaluated are too large (i.e., diameter 
and height) to permit inspections underneath racks and fixed structures and behind 
panels, which limits the inspection regions (i.e., approximately 70 percent of the U.S. 
module surface area and 30 percent of the Russian module surface area).   
F-9. All NDE systems evaluated were deemed usable, but a preference for the Sonatest Veo 
system was identified because of its simpler operating controls, computer-human 
interface, and visual display. 
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Engineering Certification Testing 
F-10. The Sonatest Veo and Olympus Omniscan MX-UT and MX2 systems had EMI emission 
exceedances.  
F-11. The Olympus Omniscan MX-UT and Sonatest Veo systems can be operated without 
batteries in the U.S. ISS modules with existing 120-Volt power inverters.   
F-12. The Olympus Omniscan MX-UT system can also be operated with a 28-Volt inverter. 
F-13. The Olympus Omniscan MX-UT and Sonatest Veo systems would exceed thermal touch 
temperatures in a vacuum in approximately 30 minutes.   
F-14. The identification of materials of construction for the NDE systems evaluated was 
incomplete.  
F-15. The Sonatest Veo and Olympus Omniscan MX-UT systems were equal in impacts on 
certification.  
8.2  Observations 
The following NESC team observations were identified: 
O-1. The development of nonstandard methods and procedures was required to enable 
quantitative damage measurements under a PWRK patch.  
O-2. The ISS crew would prefer water as an ultrasonic couplant instead of ultrasonic gel. 
O-3. The HRF operations model for conducting body ultrasound was identified as a guide for 
the development of NDE on-orbit module inspection procedures.  
O-4. The Olympus Omniscan MX-UT system has been replaced by the MX2-UT system.   
8.3  NESC Recommendations 
The following NESC recommendations are directed to the ISS Program if a decision is made to 
utilize commercial field portable NDE instrumentation aboard the ISS to mitigate IRMA risk 
4669 [ref. 1]. 
R-1. Select the Sonatest Veo PAUT system for further testing, modification, and eventual 
certification for flight.  (F-1 through F-6 and F-9 through F-15) 
a. If the Sonatest Veo system should prove inappropriate for ISS requirements, then the 
Olympus Omniscan MX UT system would be an appropriate alternative.  (F-3) 
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R-2. Develop methods to enable the ISS crew to apply reaction forces against scanning system 
spring-loaded encoders in a zero-G environment or identify alternative scanning system 
designs that do not require reaction forces.  (F-7) 
R-3. Develop compatible sensors and scanning system components to enable inspections over 
the maximum percentage of ISS modules surface area. (F-8) 
9.0  Alternate Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints. 
10.0  Other Deliverables 
There were no other deliverables. 
11.0  Lessons Learned 
There were no lessons learned. 
12.0 Recommendations for NASA Standards and Specifications 
There are no recommendations for NASA standards and specifications for this assessment. 
13.0  Definition of Terms 
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A relevant factual conclusion and/or issue that is within the assessment 
scope and that the team has rigorously based on data from their 
independent analyses, tests, inspections, and/or reviews of technical 
documentation. 
Lessons Learned Knowledge, understanding, or conclusive insight gained by experience 
that may benefit other current or future NASA programs and projects.  
The experience may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or 
negative, as in a mishap or failure. 
Observation A noteworthy fact, issue, and/or risk, which may not be directly within the 
assessment scope, but could generate a separate issue or concern if not 
addressed.  Alternatively, an observation can be a positive 
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acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational 
structure, tools, and/or support provided. 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
Recommendation A proposed measurable stakeholder action directly supported by specific 
Finding(s) and/or Observation(s) that will correct or mitigate an identified 
issue or risk. 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
Supporting Narrative A paragraph, or section, in an NESC final report that provides the detailed 
explanation of a succinctly worded finding or observation.  For example, 
the logical deduction that led to a finding or observation; descriptions of 
assumptions, exceptions, clarifications, and boundary conditions.  Avoid 
squeezing all of this information into a finding or observation. 
14.0  Acronyms List 
AC Alternating Current 
ARISS Amateur Radio on ISS 
BTU British thermal unit 
CBT Computer-based Training 
CIRD Common Interface Requirements Document 
COTS Commercial off the Shelf 
CR Change Request 
CU Communication Unit 
dB Decibel 
DC Direct Current 
EC Eddy Current 
EDM Electric Discharge Machining 
EMI Electromagnetic interference 
EMS Electromagnetic Susceptibility 
EUT Equipment Under Test 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
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FCB Functional Cargo Block 
FGB Functional and Cargo Module (Zarya)  
GHz Gigahertz 
GLADIS Global Awareness Data-exfiltration International Satellite 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GTS Global Timing System 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HRF Human Research Facility 
IRMA ISS Risk Management Application 
ISS International Space Station 
ISSP ISS Program 
IVA Intravehicular Activity 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
kHz Kilohertz 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LAN Local Area Network 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
MHz Megahertz 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MMOD Micro Meteoroid and Orbital Debris 
MOD Mission Operation Directorate 
M&P Materials and Processing 
MPLM Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 
MWM Meandering Winding Magnetometer 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB NESC Review Board 
NSD Noise Spectral Density 
OSO Operation Support Office 
PAUT Phase Array Ultrasonic Test 
PC Personal Computer 
PSD Power Spectral Density 
PWRK Pressure Wall Repair Kit 
RE Radiated Emissions 
RE02 United States Radiated Emissions 
RF Radio Frequency 
RSO3 Radiated Susceptibility 
SM Service Module (Zvezda) 
SSCS Space-to-Space Communication System 
SSP Space Station Program 
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STD Standard 
TIM Technical Interchange Meeting 
UHF Ultra-high Frequency 
UI User Interface (pop-up menus) 
U.S. United States 
USB Universal Serial Buss 
UT Ultrasonic Testing 
VGA Video Graphics Array 
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